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CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND THE 
PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY 
DARRYL K. BROWN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Two reform movements transformed American criminal law in the 
quarter century that began in the late 1960s. Their origins and effects 
were starkly different, and their conflict meant that, on core choices 
about the basis for criminal liability, one movement had to win and 
the other had to lose. The first movement was the wave of criminal 
code reform inspired by the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code (MPC), first published in 1962. The MPC movement sought to 
increase the role of culpability as a prerequisite for liability by 
presumptively requiring proof of mens rea for every element of 
criminal offenses—a policy that rejected longstanding use of strict 
liability for significant offense elements. The second movement, which 
could be called the tough-on-crime movement, became the more 
significant. This movement led to the transformation of American 
criminal-justice policy that expanded criminal offenses, enforcement, 
and sentences, resulting in a national incarceration rate that 
quintupled and became by far the world’s highest. 
  This Article identifies the twenty-four states that codified the 
MPC’s culpability rules and then recounts an extensive survey of the 
case law in those states to assess the reforms’ effect on judicial 
interpretation of mens rea requirements. It finds that legislative 
codifications of presumptions for mens rea have had surprisingly little 
effect on courts that define mens rea requirements when interpreting 
criminal statutes. It describes the recurrent rationales that courts use to 
impose strict-liability elements in a wide range of crimes, 
notwithstanding statutes that direct presumptions to the contrary. It 
then offers an explanation for this outcome—a substantial failure of 
the MPC-inspired revision of criminal codes—that emphasizes the 
continuing normative appeal of strict liability, the influence of 
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instrumental rationales for punishment, and the limits of the judicial 
role in an era in which the legislative and executive branches are 
vastly expanding the reach and severity of criminal punishment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two significant reform movements transformed American 
criminal law in the quarter century that began in the late 1960s. Both 
are familiar, yet in the continuing story of American criminal law they 
rarely appear in the same narrative. In part that is surely because 
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their origins and effects were starkly different; in critical ways they 
were in conflict. That conflict meant that, on core questions of 
criminal law, one reform movement had to win and the other had to 
lose. The effects of the movements’ conflict continue today in the 
administration of state criminal law. 
The first movement was the wave of criminal-code reform 
inspired by the American Law Institute’s (ALI’s) Model Penal Code 
(MPC), which was first published in 1962.1 Broadly speaking, the 
MPC had two ambitions. One was to bring analytical clarity to the 
definition and interpretation of criminal statutes that were encrusted 
with ill-defined common-law terms such as “malice aforethought.”2 A 
tradition of poor drafting plagued these statutes, so they commonly 
employed multiple mens rea terms and conduct-defining terms in the 
same offense.3 The second ambition was substantive: the MPC 
advocated a criminal law committed to a pervasive requirement of 
subjective culpability with respect to every significant element of 
every offense.4 MPC policy, in other words, rejected strict liability5 for 
any element of a crime, which resulted in liability being imposed 
 
 1. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  
 2. Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal 
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1431–40 (1968); Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk Dubber, An 
Introduction to the Model Penal Code 8–13 (Mar. 12, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf. 
 3. Wechsler, supra note 2, at 1436; Robinson & Dubber, supra note 2, at 8. 
 4. See Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 
594–95 (1963) (“The most important aspect of the Code is its affirmation of the centrality of 
mens rea, an affirmation that is brilliantly supported by its careful articulation of the elements of 
liability and of the various modes of culpability to which attention must be paid in framing the 
definitions of the various criminal offenses.”). 
 5. The phrase strict liability in felony criminal statutes bears specification. Offenses that 
require mens rea for one element (typically conduct) but lack culpability on one or more other 
elements are considered strict-liability offenses. Courts and statutes use the term in this way. 
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008) (describing strict-liability offenses); 
Ex parte Murry, 455 So. 2d 72, 75–79 (Ala. 1984) (noting that a capital offense that did not 
require knowledge as to the victim’s identity as a police officer would be a strict-liability 
offense), superseded by Undercover Officers Protection Act of 1987, No. 87-709, 1987 Ala. Laws 
1252 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 (LexisNexis 2005)). Scholars do so as well; 
Professor Antony Duff denotes this “substantive” strict liability: 
Liability is strict if it requires no proof of fault as to an aspect of the offence: while 
mens rea must be proved as to some elements in the offence definition, it need not be 
proved as to every fact, consequence or circumstance necessary for the commission of 
the offence. . . . Liability is substantively strict if it does not depend on proof of some 
appropriate moral culpability as to some aspect of the offence—proof of some fault 
that would justify condemning the defendant for committing the offence. 
R.A. Duff, Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence, in 
APPRAISING STRICT LIABILITY 125, 125–26 (A.P. Simester ed., 2005). 
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more proportionately to an actor’s moral fault than was true in the 
common-law tradition. 
The second reform movement was less singular in its origin and 
in the identity of its leading reformers, but it was indisputably more 
significant. This tough-on-crime movement represented the 
transformation of criminal law, enforcement, and sentencing policy 
triggered by the rising crime rates and social disorder of 1960s—and 
arguably by the political transformations of the civil rights movement, 
which occurred concurrently. Familiar features of this movement 
include a dominant tough-on-crime political discourse, a national 
incarceration rate that quintupled in three decades to become the 
world’s highest, an increased racial disproportionality in inmate 
populations, a creation of broad new criminal offenses and pretrial 
detention policies, a punitive approach to problems of illicit drug use 
and distribution, and a rejection of punishment practices based on 
individualized assessments of offenders in favor of retributive and 
deterrence rationales codified in nondiscretionary sentencing rules.6 
The MPC is generally considered a success for having inspired 
roughly half the states to revise their criminal codes in ways that 
indisputably reveal the MPC’s influence.7 But a closer look at state 
 
 6. The literature recounting this wide-ranging reformation is considerable. See generally, 
e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002) (charting the changes in crime and in the criminal-justice 
system in Britain and the United States since the 1970s); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008) (investigating the 
“increased size and scope of the criminal law” and criminal-justice system in the United States); 
MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (2d ed. 2006) (assessing the increased reliance on 
incarceration in the United States criminal-justice system); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 
31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2009), available at 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2009/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3
-26-09.pdf (investigating patterns behind rising incarceration rates in the United States); 
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME (2007) (examining the emergence of “a new 
civil and political order structured around the problem of violent crime”); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ,  
THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011) (citing failures of the American 
criminal-justice system); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1997) (discussing the 
development of the American sentencing system and proposing reforms); BRUCE WESTERN, 
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006) (investigating the relationship between 
incarceration and inequality); Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the Development of 
Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230 (2007) (explaining the relationship between 
race and increased criminalization in the latter half of the twentieth century). 
 7. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF. 
L. REV. 943, 948 (1999) (“The success of the [MPC] in stimulating American jurisdictions to 
codify or recodify their criminal law was unprecedented.”); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological 
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 511 (2001) (“The Model Penal Code . . . is 
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codes, and their interpretation since the 1970s, reveals that the MPC’s 
analytical ambition was a much greater success than its substantive 
goal, and further that the failure of the latter undermines the former. 
The MPC’s substantive agenda turned out to be poorly timed; 
legislatures took up code reform at the same time that they sought to 
dramatically increase criminal law’s effectiveness as a tool against 
violent crime and drug markets, which they did by increasing 
sentences, the range of offenses, and the scope of individual crime 
definitions. The MPC’s substantive agenda cut the other way by 
seeking to limit liability unjustified by a finding of fault through proof 
of mens rea. When the MPC reform movement conflicted with the 
tough-on-crime movement, it was, unsurprisingly, the MPC’s reform 
efforts—the efforts of legal professionals and academics more than 
politicians—that lost. 
Yet that loss is not readily apparent, because twenty-four state 
codes notably resemble the MPC, especially as to the central 
culpability rules in MPC “Part I: General Provisions”—the provisions 
that provide definitions, premises, and interpretive rules for specific 
offenses.8 Those provisions define the critical elements of the MPC’s 
 
widely (though not universally, and perhaps not correctly) regarded as a great success.”); id. at 
584 & n.279 (stating that the MPC inspired a large number of state code revisions). 
 8. MODEL PENAL CODE pt. I (Official Draft 1985). By my criteria, in 2011, twenty-four 
states had “general principles” or “rules of construction” that adopted variants of MPC 
§ 2.02(3) and § 2.02(4). They are: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-2-3 to -4 (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA 
STAT. § 11.81.610 (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-203 
(2006); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-502 to -503 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (2007); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-204, -207 (LexisNexis 
2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2 (LexisNexis 
2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5202 (Supp. 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2006); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 562.021, -.026 (West 2012); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2 (West 2005); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 15.15 (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2901.21 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.095, -.105, -.115 (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 302 (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§§ 6.01 to -.04 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008). Kentucky, 
however, is a marginal case: it lacks an equivalent to MPC § 2.02(4), and it codified only a 
weakened modification of § 2.02(3) in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2006); see also 
infra note 19. I exclude Montana’s code because it includes no version of MPC § 2.02(3) or 
§ 2.02(4), even though it reflects MPC influence because its code requires at least negligence 
“with respect to each element described by the statute.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103 (2011); 
see also id. § 45-2-104 (requiring culpability for “each element of offense”). This negligence 
requirement was adapted from MPC § 2.02(1) and § 2.05. Washington is also excluded because 
its code lacks any reference to the MPC’s mens rea presumptions, although its definitions of 
culpability terms track the MPC. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.010 (2009). Louisiana is also 
excluded because its culpability definitions reflect little MPC influence. Most notably, it retains 
the common law terms “general intent” and “specific intent” and does not adopt the MPC’s 
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analytical advance: an exclusive list of clearly defined mens rea terms 
coupled with a set of interpretive rules that both imply mens rea 
requirements in offense definitions that lack a mens rea term and that 
presume that an explicit mens rea term in a statute applies to all of its 
elements.9 The problem is that the MPC’s analytical and substantive 
agendas are not easily separated. Rejecting the commitment to 
proportional, subjective culpability undermines the MPC’s approach 
to consistent analytical clarity in the interpretation of criminal 
offenses, and thus in the clarity of criminal law generally. 
The project of this Article is, first, to document how the MPC-
inspired analytical advances in state criminal codes have turned out to 
be less significant than they initially seemed. The second ambition is 
to explain why American criminal law turned out this way. One 
explanation lies, as noted above, in recent political history. A second 
explanation, however, is situated in contemporary criminal-law 
theory, where debates continue, by courts as well as scholars, 
regarding the normative appeal of the MPC’s commitment to 
proportional culpability. More broadly, the debate is about the 
meaning of criminal law’s core premise, actus non facit reum nisi mens 
sit rea:10 no guilty act without a guilty mind. Anglo-American criminal 
 
culpability terms and definitions. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:7–14:12 (2007) (setting out 
general principles of criminal law). 
 9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (“When the culpability sufficient to establish a 
material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person 
acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto.”); id. § 2.02(4) (noting that an 
explicit culpability term applies to all material elements “unless a contrary purpose plainly 
appears”). These are the two most important provisions, and I use primarily these two to 
classify jurisdictions as “MPC states” in Parts I and II. The MPC, however, contains additional 
provisions that address culpability requirements and their effect on liability. See, e.g., MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (stating that guilt requires at least proof of negligence for each material 
element); id. § 2.03 (stating that causation is not established unless a result was “within the 
purpose or the contemplation of the actor” or “within the risk of which the actor . . . should be 
aware”); id. § 2.04(2) (“[I]gnorance or mistake . . . shall reduce the grade and degree of the 
offense of which [the defendant] may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be 
guilty had the situation been as he supposed.”); id. § 2.05 (“[W]hen absolute liability is imposed 
with respect to any material element of an offense . . . the offense constitutes [only a non-
criminal] violation . . . .”). 
 10. R v. Tolson, (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 168, 172 (Eng.) (internal quotation mark omitted); see 
also, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (noting that liability requires the 
“concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand”); People v. Valley Steel Prods. 
Co., 375 N.E.2d 1297, 1305 (Ill. 1978) (“It would be unthinkable to subject a person to a long 
term of imprisonment for an offense he might commit unknowingly.”). William Blackstone has 
also noted that “to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be first, a vicious will; and, 
secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *21; see also State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 363 & n.3 (Or. 2007) (citing 
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law has long moved on from the most restrictive understanding of this 
premise, labeled the “unlawful act” theory, attributed to Sir Edward 
Coke and according to which the voluntary commission of any 
criminal conduct made one criminally liable for any resulting harm. 
On Coke’s view, wrongfully shooting at a chicken and unforeseeably 
killing a person constituted murder.11 Its antipode is the MPC 
position, found in some state codes12 and defended by many criminal 
law scholars, that criminal liability requires that an actor be 
culpable—meaning he has intent, knowledge, or recklessness—as to 
each significant element of an offense.13 Among English scholars, this 
idea is called the principle of correspondence.14 On both the 
American and English accounts, the effect of mens rea requirements 
for each offense element provides its normative appeal: the degree of 
liability and punishment will be proportionate to culpability and 
limited by it. Yet the dominant view in contemporary courts regarding 
mens rea requirements lies between Coke’s view at one end of the 
spectrum and the MPC position at the other. Especially in states that 
adopted the MPC’s culpability provisions, this represents a failure of 
those statutes (and the MPC model) to constrain and direct judicial 
decision making. More broadly, the courts’ dominant position reveals 
that the MPC’s substantive position on culpability—or the 
correspondence principle—has proven normatively unpersuasive to 
courts, which adopt instead a more limited, intermediate role for 
culpability in criminal liability. 
 
Blackstone’s remark to support the statement that “[i]n Oregon, criminal liability generally 
requires an act that is combined with a particular mental state”). 
 11. See 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 56 (London, W. 
Clarke & Sons 1809) (1669) (“[If the Defendant has shot] at any tame fowle of another mans, 
and the arrow by [mistake] had killed a man, this had been murder, for the act was unlawfull.”). 
 12. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(a) (West 2005) (noting that, with specified 
exceptions, “a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly 
or negligently . . . with respect to each material element of the offense”). 
 13. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, A Change of Normative Position: Determining the 
Contours of Culpability in Criminal Law, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 232, 235–38 (2008) (noting that 
“[s]ubjectivist justifications for culpability focus on the elements of choice and belief, and so 
may be found at the opposite end of the spectrum of liability for resulting harm”). This idea of 
proportional culpability appears in the constitutional law governing capital murder. See, e.g., 
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (“American criminal law has long considered a 
defendant’s intention—and therefore his moral guilt—to be critical to ‘the degree of [his] 
criminal culpability,’ and the Court has found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally 
excessive in the absence of intentional wrongdoing.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975))). 
 14. E.g., ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 76 (6th ed. 2007); VICTOR 
TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 93–97 (2005). 
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This debate over culpability requirements matters for broader 
reasons of political legitimacy—the justifications of state authority to 
punish individuals and the practical meaning of state respect for 
individual rights. The correspondence principle has been defended as 
essential to respect for autonomy; it ensures that one is punished only 
for choices one has made, not for events one did not will or 
anticipate.15 It reflects basic values of classical liberalism and rejects 
the state’s power to use individuals for public ends, even for a 
laudable goal like harm prevention.16 State codes that fail to abide by 
the correspondence principle implicitly assert a different justification 
for criminal law, for state power over citizens’ liberty and individual 
autonomy. Yet most do fail to adhere to the correspondence 
principle, even the states that enacted MPC culpability provisions. 
The prevalence of strict-liability elements in state felony crimes, 
typically for result and circumstance elements, demonstrates this 
pervasive failure. These strict-liability elements frequently define the 
difference between greater and lesser offenses, and thus the sole 
ground for greater (sometimes mandatory) punishments.17 This form 
of strict liability, affirmed and expanded by widespread interpretive 
practices of courts in MPC states, means that punishment bears no 
proportional relation to culpability, despite states’ codification of 
MPC-based culpability rules. 
Finally, this Article’s assessment of contemporary criminal law in 
the wake of the MPC and tough-on-crime reform movements 
generates insights on issues of judicial craft and institutional role. 
State courts’ patterns of criminal statutory construction provide 
another lesson in the challenges of simplifying and stabilizing judicial 
methods of statutory interpretation.  In the wake of state legislatures 
 
 15. See Ashworth, supra note 13, at 238 (“Starting from respect for the moral autonomy of 
all individuals, subjectivists argue that criminal liability should not be imposed in respect of a 
given harm unless [the defendant] intended to cause or knowingly risked causing that 
harm . . . .”). 
 16. See ASHWORTH, supra note 14, at 87 (noting the link between the correspondence 
principle and individual autonomy); TADROS, supra note 14, at 93–97 (highlighting the 
arguments supporting and undercutting the connection between the correspondence principle, 
subjectivity, and autonomy). 
 17. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I)–(II) (2012) (defining knowing or 
reckless child abuse as a class 2 felony if death results and a class 3 felony if serious bodily injury 
results). Even the MPC cannot avoid some offense distinctions based on results without 
corresponding proof of a culpable mental state. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.1, -.3 
(Official Draft 1985) (defining manslaughter as reckless conduct causing death), with id. § 211.2 
(defining reckless endangerment as conduct putting another at risk of death but not causing 
death). 
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adopting MPC-based interpretive rules for their criminal codes, state 
courts have frequently disregarded them.  When they have not, they 
frequently construe those interpretive provisions themselves in a way 
that undercuts their effect. Perhaps more notably, this Article also 
reveals the limited capacity and inclination of American courts to 
resist abetting political trends in criminal-justice policy. And this is so 
even when those trends breach the codified commitments of criminal 
law, and when courts’ alternative is merely to adhere to the legitimate 
judicial role of narrowly construing criminal statutes and leaving 
expansions of liability to the political branches. Part I offers a broad 
survey of judicial interpretations of mens rea requirements in “MPC 
states”—states I identify based on their codification of the most 
important MPC culpability presumptions. It identifies recurrent 
rationales and interpretive choices from decisions in a representative 
range of MPC states. I then discuss how courts use these rationales to 
limit or avoid the full effect of their states’ MPC-based culpability 
presumptions. Part II looks more closely at the language of 
culpability provisions that state legislatures have enacted. It classifies 
all of the MPC states according to the strength of those presumptions. 
Most MPC states enacted strong presumptions—meaning rules 
equivalent to the MPC provisions. A notable minority chose to 
weaken those presumptions and give legislative approval of strict 
liability. But those “weak presumption” jurisdictions are not the only 
ones in which judges favor strict liability, and the strength of the state 
codes’ presumptions do not correlate well with judges’ interpretive 
behavior in those MPC states. Part III describes the implicit limited-
culpability principle that prevails among state courts to justify strict 
liability. The dominant judicial view requires proof only of culpable 
conduct, or culpability for some basic offense, to which additional 
strict-liability elements are added to create a more serious offense. 
Culpability serves only to make actors eligible for punishment; 
beyond that, instrumental rationales determine offense grades and 
sentencing severity. Part IV builds on this account to explain why 
courts have continued to widely endorse strict criminal liability 
despite legislative codification of presumptions for culpability 
requirements. The explanatory story describes the normative appeal 
of a limited role for culpability and also emphasizes courts’ 
institutional role during the last half century’s vast expansion of 
criminal punishment. 
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I.  JUDICIAL INFERENCE OF CULPABILITY AND STRICT LIABILITY 
A. A Note on Methodology 
Although a complete survey of all state statutory provisions 
governing culpability and adopted from the MPC is presented in Part 
II, a comprehensive account of judicial interpretation practices for 
mental-state requirements in the twenty-four MPC states would be a 
more daunting endeavor than I undertake here. Fortunately, that is 
not necessary for the present purpose, which is to identify trends in 
the uses of MPC culpability presumptions and to identify the effects 
that those presumptions have had in states that codified some version 
of them. To identify interpretive practices in state courts, I first 
reviewed all state criminal codes to identify those that codify an 
identifiable variation of the MPC’s key interpretive rules and 
presumptions regarding culpability requirements for elements of 
criminal offenses—MPC § 2.02(3) and § 2.02(4).18 I coded twenty-four 
states as “MPC states” on these criteria, listed in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18. The two most important provisions are MPC § 2.02(3), which states that courts should 
infer recklessness for any material element for which a culpability requirement is not specified, 
and § 2.02(4), which states that an explicit culpability term applies to all material elements 
“unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.” Only states that codified a variation of at least one 
of these are listed as MPC states here. 
  For other important MPC provisions governing mens rea, see § 2.02(1), which requires 
at least proof of negligence for each material element, and § 2.05, which states that “when 
absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of an offense . . . the offense 
constitutes [only a noncriminal] violation.” Sixteen of the twenty-four MPC states adopted a 
version of § 2.02(1). See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.030(2) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 32 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.016(1) (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN.    
§ 45-2-103 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(a) (West 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(a) 
(West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(a)(1) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(a) 
(West 2011). Seven have some version of MPC § 2.05. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-9 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.026 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-
104 (2011). For a detailed accounting of state codes that incorporate MPC § 2.05 in varying 
ways, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.5(c) n.47 (2d ed. 2003).  
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   Table 1. 
MPC States 2011 Code 
Sections 
MPC States 2011 Code 
Sections 
Alabama ALA. CODE 
§§ 13A-2-3 to -4 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 34 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. 
§ 11.81.610 
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 561.021, -.026 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-202 
New 
Hampshire 
N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 626:2 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-2-203 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:2-2 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. 
§§ 18-1-502 to -503 
New York N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 15.15 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 53A-5 
North 
Dakota 
N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-02-02 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 251 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2901.21 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 702-204,        
-207 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 161.095, -.105,        
-.115 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-41-2-2 
Pennsylvania 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 302 
Illinois 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/4–3 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-11-301  
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-5202 
Texas TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. §§ 6.01 to -.04  
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 501.040 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-2-102 
 
As Part II describes in more detail, I subclassified these states as 
“strong” MPC states if their codes included versions of both MPC 
§ 2.02(3) and § 2.02(4) and did not significantly weaken these 
sections’ presumptions of mens rea, and as “weaker” or “weak” MPC 
states if they either significantly modified one of those MPC 
presumptions or failed to adopt one altogether. 
To survey the case law addressing mens rea issues governed by 
these MPC-based statutes, I limited the inquiry to court decisions 
from eleven of these twenty-four MPC states—six in the stronger 
category and five in the weaker.19 For narrative ease, I focus on the 
 
 19. To target states with larger bodies of case law, I biased selection toward states with 
larger populations (thus avoiding, inter alia, Alaska, Delaware, and North Dakota). See Annual 
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text primarily in seven states: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, and (to a lesser degree) Texas. Largely in 
the footnotes, I add case law from the other four states—Alabama, 
Indiana, New Jersey, and New York—that have case law that is 
basically consistent with the case law discussed in the text. 
To identify relevant decisions, I read every state appellate 
decision available on Westlaw in each of the eleven states that cited 
that state’s statutes codifying an MPC-based interpretive presumption 
for mens rea requirements.20 From this search, a set of offenses 
defined in nearly all eleven states appeared—primarily drug offenses, 
weapons offenses, and offenses involving minors, all of which present 
recurrent questions of mens rea requirements for critical elements 
such as a weapon’s characteristics or a minor’s age.21 This method has 
a limit, however, which is itself an indicator of the limited influence of 
these MPC-based interpretive rules: state courts sometimes address 
interpretive questions about mens rea requirements without any 
reference to their states’ statutes that govern these questions.22 To 
 
Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: 
April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.census.gov/
popest/data/state/totals/2011/tables/NST-EST2011-01.xls (listing estimated state populations as 
of July 2011). I also avoided states that adopted MPC-based statutes comparatively recently. 
Thus I did not study Kansas case law because that state revised its code in 2011, Act effective 
July 1, 2011, 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws 1409 (codified as amended in KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 21 (Supp. 
2011)), and so little case law exists under the new provisions. Additionally, I did not select 
Kentucky because its code only marginally fits my criteria as an MPC state; it has no version of 
MPC § 2.02(4) and a weak analog to § 2.02(3). See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2006) 
(“Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a 
culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with 
respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily 
involves such culpable mental state.”); id. § 501.030 (defining recklessness as the lowest 
“culpable mental state”). I avoided North Dakota because its code’s equivalents to those MPC 
provisions are uniquely worded (and poorly drafted) revisions. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-
02(2) (2012) (“If a statute . . . defining a crime does not specify any culpability and does not 
provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the culpability that is required 
is willfully.”); id. § 12.1-02-02(1)(e) (defining “willfully” as “engag[ing] in the conduct 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly”). 
 20. I located these decisions two ways: (1) running a Westlaw search in each state’s 
appellate case law database for the relevant code provisions; and (2) using all cases listed in the 
annotations to each state’s MPC-based statute. 
 21. The MPC itself includes one offense that expressly attaches strict liability to a 
significant offense element, which is the element of the minor victim’s age (ten years old or less) 
in sexual assaults. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (“Whenever . . . the criminality of 
conduct depends on a child’s being below the age of 10, it is no defense that the actor did not 
know the child’s age, or reasonably believed the child to be older than 10.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Steelman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 152, 154–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Smith, 
963 A.2d 281, 285–89 (N.J. 2009); Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).  
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find a sampling of these decisions, I searched state appellate 
databases and annotated codes for the type of offense that, in other 
MPC jurisdictions, had presented a mens rea issue that led a court to 
cite an MPC-based culpability rule. I also identified some decisions in 
this category by their citation to earlier decisions that had cited the 
MPC statutes. Finally, I supplemented these approaches by reference 
to published surveys of state decisional law on specific crimes and 
prior scholarship on mens rea rules in specific jurisdictions.23 
The survey reveals widespread judicial endorsement of strict-
liability elements in MPC jurisdictions, despite state statutes that 
dictate presumptions otherwise.24 Culpability presumptions have 
failed to displace judicial conventions of statutory interpretation that 
favor strict liability. The overall picture is one in which codifications 
of MPC-based mens rea provisions have had only modest effect.25 
 
 23. My sources include: Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the 
Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (2003) (studying age elements in state 
statutory rape offenses); Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability 
Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the 
Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229 (1997); Richard Singer, Strict Criminal Liability: 
Alabama State Courts Lead the Way into the Twenty-First Century, 46 ALA. L. REV. 47 (1994) 
(studying Alabama law); James R. Wyrsch & Jacqueline A. Cook, The Missouri Mens Rea 
Requirement: New Missouri Supreme Court Opinion and How the Requirement Has Changed, 66 
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 499 (1998) (studying Missouri law); Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or 
Lack of Information as to Victim’s Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 46 A.L.R.5th 499 (1997); 
Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes 
Prohibiting Sale or Possession of Controlled Substances Within Specified Distance of Schools, 27 
A.L.R.5th 593 (1995); James N. Kourie, Annotation, Mens Rea or Guilty Intent as Necessary 
Element of Offense of Contributing to Delinquency or Dependency of Minor, 31 A.L.R.3d 848 
(1970). Additionally, I reviewed Westlaw’s case-law annotations under the culpability-
presumption statutes of MPC jurisdictions. 
 24. As will be noted, describing court decisions as “contradicting” a codified interpretive 
rule is a judgment call, because the statute defining the interpretive rule must itself be 
interpreted, and at least in some cases reasonable disagreements can exist as to the better 
interpretation. For another study finding state high courts that ignore their state legislature’s 
codified rules of statutory interpretation, see Abbe R. Gluck, States as Laboratories of Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 
1750, 1787–91 (2010), which cites the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as an example. 
 25. The modest effects of MPC provisions are disappointing at least from the perspective 
of the MPC’s primary drafters and advocates, who were led by Professor Herbert Wechsler. For 
his views, see, for example, Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE, at xi. In that 
Foreword, Professor Wechsler describes the MPC’s influence two decades after the release of its 
preliminary draft, MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962), and he counts thirty-
four states as having revised their codes under some influence of the MPC, Wechsler, supra, at 
xi. That claim of thirty-four states is overstated in the sense that some of those code revisions 
borrowed only in minor respects from the MPC and rejected its most important components, 
including its Article 2 definitions of, and interpretive default rules for, culpability terms. See 
supra note 8. Specifically, ten of those states enacted none of the culpability provisions in their 
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Most courts in MPC states are far from committed to strong readings 
of the culpability presumptions in their codes. 
B. Limits on Culpability Presumptions (Part One): Plain Language 
or Statutory Purpose 
To begin, consider a routine mens rea question that faces state 
courts. Most states have a statute, such as the following, that increases 
the punishment for basic felony drug offenses upon proof of the 
additional fact that the conduct occurred within a certain distance 
from a school.26 A common definition of the offense reads: 
Any person who, as prohibited in another section, sells or possesses 
with intent to sell to another person any controlled substance within 
one thousand feet of any public or private school shall be 
imprisoned for a term of three years in addition and consecutive to 
any term of imprisonment for any other offenses arising from the 
same conduct. To constitute a violation of this subsection, an act of 
transporting or possessing a controlled substance shall be with intent 
to sell or dispense within one thousand feet of a school.27 
Note that the statute has an explicit mental-state requirement, 
“with intent to,” which appears in the predicate offense as well.28 The 
mens rea issue arises from the ambiguity in the last sentence; the 
question is whether one must act with intent merely to sell, or also 
with intent that the sale be within 1000 feet of a school. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted this statute in State 
v. Denby29 and recognized that its legislature provided guidance for 
 
codes: Georgia, Florida, Iowa, Kansas (although Kansas finally adopted them in 2011, Act 
effective July 1, 2011, § 13, 2010 Kan. Sess. Laws 1409, 1418–19 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-5202 (Supp. 2011))), Nebraska, New Mexico, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wyoming. For a comparable finding of the modest effects of state legislatures’ codification of 
statutory-interpretation rules, see Gluck, supra note 24, at 1787–91. 
 26. See Bateman, supra note 23 (collecting statutes and cases). 
 27. This is an edited version of Public Act No. 89-256, § 1(b), 1989 Conn. Acts 633, 634 
(codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278a(b) (West 2006)). The provision 
was amended in 1992 to increase the distance from school to 1500 feet. Public Act No. 92-82, 
1992 Conn. Acts 235, 235–36 (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278a(b) 
(West 2006)). To accord with the analysis quoted in State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1995); 
see infra text accompanying notes 29–36, however, I use the earlier version of section 21a-
278a(b). The current form of the statutory provision was enacted in 1994. Public Act No. 92-82, 
§ 1(b), 1994 Conn. Acts 1061, 1062 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278a(b) (West 
2006)). 
 28. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-277 (West 2006). 
 29. State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1995). 
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this question in the mens rea presumption it adopted based on the 
MPC.30 It recited, “When one and only one of such [mental-state] 
terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply 
to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application 
clearly appears.”31 The language of the offense in light of this 
directive, the court concluded, made its meaning unambiguous.32 The 
offense “specifically requires a mental state of ‘intent,’ which must be 
applied to every element of that statute.”33 The “plain 
language . . . dictates only one construction”34—that the 1000-foot 
requirement is a strict liability element. The prosecutor must prove 
that the offense occurred within the 1000-foot zone, but she “is not, 
however, required to prove that the defendant knew that this location 
was within the zone.”35 This is evident from the “plain language” of 
the statute, which overcomes the statutory presumption: 
The mental state of knowledge that the location is within the 1000 
foot zone is not set forth in § 21a-278a(b). An “intent” element is 
not synonymous with a “knowledge” element, each of which is 
specifically defined in the penal code. The absence of any statutory 
requirement that the defendant knowingly sell within the prohibited 
school zone demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to make 
knowledge an element of the crime.36 
 
 30. Id. at 685. 
 31. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 1988)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Section 53a-5 of the Connecticut Code was originally enacted by Public Act No. 828, 
§ 5, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts 1554, 1556 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2007 & 
Supp. 2012)), twenty-five years before the school-zone drug offense, section 21a-278a(b), was 
enacted in its current form in 1994. For an example of the court establishing an interpretation of 
the offense prior to the enactment of the mens rea presumption, compare Public Act No. 828, 
§ 5, 1969 Conn. Pub. Acts at 1556, with Public Act No. 92-82, § 1(b), 1994 Conn. Acts at 1062. 
Thus there is no issue of the court having established an interpretation of the offense prior to 
enactment of the mens rea presumption. 
 32. Denby, 668 A.2d at 685. 
 33. Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21a-278a(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991)). 
 34. Id. The intermediate appellate court similarly found that “by the clear language of the 
statute, such an intent is not an element of the crime.” State v. Denby, 646 A.2d 909, 913 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 668 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1995). 
 35. Denby, 668 A.2d at 685. 
 36. See id. (“If the legislature had wanted to make knowledge as to location of a school an 
element of the offense, it would have done so by specifically stating . . . that the defendant knew 
[he] was in, or on, or within 1000 feet of a school.”). One might explain this interpretation with 
reference to the Connecticut legislature’s revision to the MPC’s definitions of mental states 
when it adopted them. The legislature defined the term “intentionally” (the word that many 
states substitute for the MPC’s “purposely”) solely with reference to result conduct elements, 
for which intention means “conscious objective.” Public Act No. 828, § 3(9), 1969 Conn. Pub. 
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Denby is a representative example of the relatively low standard 
that state courts often apply to conclude that a legislative intention 
for strict liability clearly appears. In contrast to the Connecticut 
legislature’s relative lack of clarity in specifying a strict-liability 
element, a few state legislatures that enacted both the MPC 
culpability presumptions and a similar school-zone offense made their 
intent to impose strict liability exceedingly clear. New Jersey’s 
equivalent statute, for example, specifies that “it shall be no defense 
to a prosecution for a violation of this section that the actor was 
unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 
1,000 feet of any school property.”37 Utah, another MPC state, did the 
same, as did Louisiana.38 
The details of the Denby analysis are specific to the decision but 
the holding is the same in nearly every state that adopted the MPC 
culpability presumptions, and in non-MPC states as well.39 Several 
other states whose codes contain both a version of this offense and 
the MPC-based presumptions reached the same result, although the 
clarity of their reasoning varies and differences in statutory language 
provide some grounds for distinction.40 
 
Acts at 1555 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-3(11) (West 2007)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). In contrast, the MPC adds (a bit awkwardly) a definition of intent with respect 
to circumstances such as location: intention means one is “aware of the existence of such 
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(ii) 
(Official Draft 1985). Denby did not note the statutory definition of intention, but Connecticut’s 
shorter version might help explain the court’s assumption that “intent” could not apply to the 
school-zone element, forcing it to assess only whether “knowledge” was required. The absence 
of a knowledge term meant, to the state court, that an exception to the mental-state 
presumption “clearly appear[ed].” Denby, 668 A.2d at 685. 
 37. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012); see also State v. Morales, 539 
A.2d 769, 775–76 (N.J. 1987) (holding that the strict-liability offense is constitutional).  
 38. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:981.3(B) (2012) (“Lack of knowledge that the prohibited 
act occurred on or within two thousand feet of school or drug treatment facility property shall 
not be a defense.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(4)(e) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2012) 
(providing that it is not a defense that the actor was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was in or near a school or within one thousand feet of a school); see also State v. 
Williams, 729 So. 2d 1080, 1081–82 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the strict-liability offense is 
constitutional). Several statutes in non-MPC states do the same. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
94C, § 32J (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2012) (providing that it is not a defense that the actor was 
unaware that the act occurred in or near a school); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.435(2) 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2012) (same). 
 39. For examples from non-MPC states, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:981.3(B) (2012) and 
Bateman, supra note 23. 
 40. In addition to cases discussed below, for Pennsylvania law, see Commonwealth v. 
Murphy, 592 A.2d 750, 754–55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), which held that there is no mens rea 
requirement for school proximity because that factor was in a sentencing guideline provision 
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The Oregon Supreme Court reached the same interpretation of 
its school-zone drug offense, which lacks an express culpability term. 
Oregon’s statute reads: “Except as authorized [in other sections], it is 
unlawful for any person to manufacture or deliver a . . . controlled 
substance within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising a public or 
private . . . school . . . . (a) [A violation] is a Class A felony . . . .”41 In 
State v. Rutley,42 the court cited and discussed Oregon’s MPC-inspired 
statutes that define presumptions of culpability.43 It quickly concluded 
that a culpability requirement must be implied into the offense, but it 
then focused on the mens rea provision that states, “[A] culpable 
mental state is not required if . . . an offense . . . clearly indicates a 
legislative intent to dispense with any culpable mental state 
requirement for the offense or any material element thereof.”44 In a 
move common among courts in MPC states, the court then turned to 
traditional interpretive conventions—the ordinary meaning of 
language and statutory purpose. The language indicates strict liability 
because “the 1,000-foot distance is not logically or grammatically 
separated” from other components of the offense definition, and 
because the legislature’s purpose is explicitly instrumental: “to 
protect children from drug use.”45 For these reasons, Rutley found 
clear indications for strict liability on the element of distance from the 
school. 
 
rather than the offense definition. For Indiana law, see Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243, 244–45 
(Ind. 1996) and Steelman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 152, 154–56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), which held that 
the legislature did not intend to require awareness of proximity to a school. Even though the 
offense definition requires the drug offense to be committed “knowingly or intentionally,” in 
reaching the strict-liability holding for the school-zone element, neither decision makes any 
reference to section 35-41-2-2(d) of the Indiana Code, which states that “if a kind of culpability 
is required for commission of the offense, it is required with respect to every material element,” 
id.; see Saxton v. Smith, 315 S.W.3d 293, 296, 299 (Ky. 2010) (noting that neither mens rea 
presumptions nor the Constitution require proof of culpability for the school-distance element 
that would increase drug offense liability); State v. Smith, 48 S.W.3d 159, 165–69 (Tenn. Crim. 
App. 2000) (same). 
 41. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.904 (2011). At the time of Rutley, this statute was codified at OR. 
REV. STAT. § 475.999 (1990). 
 42. State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361 (Or. 2007). 
 43. Id. at 363–64 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.095, .-105, .-115 (2005)). 
 44. Id. at 364 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.105(1)(b) (2005)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 45. Id. at 365. More fully: “[T]he statute at issue here required that the 1,000-foot distance 
be measured from ‘the real property comprising a public or private elementary, secondary or 
career school attended primarily by minors.’ In that phrase, the 1,000-foot distance is not 
logically or grammatically separated from the other school-related requirements.” Id. (citation 
omitted) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 475.999 (1999)). 
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Ohio provides a final variation of how an MPC state reaches the 
same conclusion. Subsection (A) of the Ohio offense defines the basic 
crime: “No person shall knowingly . . . [s]ell or offer to sell a 
controlled substance.”46 Subsection (C) then specifies, without 
repeating “knowingly,” the grade of the offense according to a range 
of factors—drug type, quantity, and proximity of the conduct to a 
school.47 In interpreting this offense, the Ohio Court of Appeals in 
State v. Ward48 reached the same strict-liability holding as the courts in 
Denby and Rutley. And it did so with only the barest 
acknowledgement of Ohio’s version of the MPC culpability 
presumption,49 which states that “[w]hen the section defining an 
offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly 
indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct 
described in the section, then culpability is not required.”50 Ward did 
not quote this provision; it merely cited it as authority for this odd 
assertion: “[T]he Ohio legislature has attached criminal liability to 
criminal conduct without the requirement of a culpable mental 
state.”51 Instead of describing “plain indications” to impose strict 
liability, the court offered three brief rationales for the holding: the 
school-proximity offense “does not criminalize otherwise innocent 
behavior,”52 additional punishment serves the statute’s “purpose of 
protecting children in schools,”53 and those who sell drugs near 
schools even unknowingly “deserve proportionately greater 
punishment.”54 The last rationale is telling; it demonstrates a judicial 
conception of proportionate desert unconnected to an actor’s 
culpability and determined entirely by a strict-liability circumstance 
element. 
 
 46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.03(A) (West 2006). 
 47. Id. § 2925.03(C). 
 48. State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
 49. Id. at 19; see also State v. Harris, 623 N.E.2d 1240, 1243–44 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)  (“The 
mens rea requirement is met by the knowing sale or offer to sell a controlled substance. This 
fact assures that the ‘schoolyard’ provision does not ‘criminalize a broad range of apparently 
innocent conduct.’ Under such circumstances, due process does not require that [defendant] 
specifically knew that the drug sale in which she took part was conducted within one thousand 
feet of a school.”). 
 50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (West 2006). 
 51. Ward, 637 N.E.2d at 19. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Cross, 900 F.2d, 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1990)). 
 54. Id. 
BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2012  10:02 AM 
2012] PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY 303 
In Denby, Rutley, and Ward, state courts employed various 
interpretive strategies that avoid or undermine their state codes’ 
MPC culpability presumptions. Those decisions may represent 
judicial misunderstanding of those presumptions or resistance to 
them. These courts, by different rationales, applied culpability 
presumptions narrowly to justify strict liability; they took from the 
codification of culpability presumptions little legislative disfavor of 
strict liability, even for offenses in which a legislative choice for strict 
liability was not express. Alternately (or additionally), the decisions 
may signal the limits of what the MPC’s interpretive canons can be 
expected to achieve. General interpretive rules themselves require 
interpretation, and these join a body of established interpretive 
conventions that they do not fully displace. As a result, MPC-based 
interpretive rules provide courts with less determinative guidance 
than their legislative drafters might have expected. Every state’s 
culpability presumption, like the MPC’s,55 provide for exceptions to 
the presumption if legislative intent “plainly appears” or is “clearly 
indicated.”56 Courts identify those occasions with the traditional tools 
of statutory interpretation. They infer legislative intent, as Rutley put 
it, from “indirect indicators” such as plain language, grammatical 
analysis, sentence and paragraph structure, legislative history, or 
presumed purpose.57 One convention, such as plain meaning in 
Denby, may be sufficient to find a clearly indicated exception. But 
Rutley and Ward illustrate the use of one especially important 
convention that state courts very often cite, when interpreting many 
 
 55. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(4) (Official Draft 1985) (noting that an explicit 
culpability term applies to all material elements “unless a contrary purpose plainly appears”). 
 56. See statutes cited supra Table 1. 
 57. See State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 365 (Or. 2007) (“[T]his court has attempted to 
determine the legislature’s intent by examining the offense or element of the offense and a 
variety of indirect indicators to determine whether the legislature would have had an obvious 
reason or reasons to omit a culpable mental state.”). Rutley candidly noted that the legislature 
had not specified whether courts should use traditional statutory-interpretation tools to 
determine legislative intent under the MPC provisions; in the absence of guidance, it chose to 
do so. Id. at 364. 
  A typical statement of statutory-interpretation protocols in the context of mens rea is 
State v. Robinson, 718 P.2d 1313 (Kan. 1986): 
Whether or not criminal intent or knowledge is an element of a statutory crime 
depends on the will of the legislature. Legislative intent is a matter of statutory 
construction, to be determined in a given case from consideration of the language of 
the statute in connection with the subject matter of the prohibition, the statute’s 
manifest purpose and design, and the consequences of the several constructions to 
which the statute may be susceptible. 
Id. at 1316. 
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different statutes, to justify strict liability. That convention is for 
courts to draw a strong inference of strict liability from a statute’s 
instrumental purpose to protect a particular victim class or prevent a 
specific harm, a purpose that courts commonly infer from a statute’s 
text or legislative history.58 
The Ohio Supreme Court has a notable record of finding strict-
liability exceptions to the culpability presumption its legislature 
adopted in 1972.59 In a 1981 case, State v. Wac,60 the court interpreted 
Ohio’s bookmaking offense,61 which punishes individuals who 
“[e]ngage in bookmaking, or knowingly engage in conduct that 
facilitates bookmaking.”62 Mr. Wac was charged with engaging in 
bookmaking, and the state supreme court addressed whether the 
offense required proof of mens rea, in light of the state’s presumption 
for a recklessness standard when an offense “does not specify any 
degree of culpability” and does not “plainly indicate[] a purpose to 
impose strict liability.”63 Wac found a plain indication for strict 
liability because no culpability term accompanies “engage in 
bookmaking,” but one does accompany the subsequent phrase 
defining the facilitation offense.64 This is odd, in part because 
bookmaking is defined as “the business of receiving or paying off 
bets.”65 It is hard to imagine one doing that conduct unknowingly, 
or—in recklessness terms—doing it while unaware of the risk one is 
receiving or paying bets. The legislature, rather than plainly 
indicating strict liability, probably sought to avoid redundancy: 
although one always receives or pays bets knowingly,66 one could 
 
 58. State v. Gandhi, 989 A.2d 256 (N.J. 2010), provides another example, see id. at 271 
(“[B]ased on the statutory language and the history to the statutory offense of stalking, we do 
not discern a legislative intent to restrict the applicability of the anti-stalking statute to a stalker-
defendant who purposefully or knowingly intended that his course of conduct would cause a 
reasonable victim to fear bodily injury or death. Rather the plain language of the statutory 
offense, reasonably read, prohibits a defendant from purposefully or knowingly engaging in a 
course of conduct . . . that would cause such fear in an objectively reasonable person.”). 
 59. Amended Substitute House Bill No. 511, § 2901.21, 1971 Ohio Laws 1866, 1897–98 
(codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21 (West 2006)). 
 60. State v. Wac, 428 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1981). 
 61. Id. at 431.62. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02(A)(1) (West 2006). 
 62. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.02(A)(1) (West 2006). 
 63. Id. § 2901.21(B). 
 64. Wac, 428 N.E.2d at 431. 
 65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2915.01(A) (West 2006). 
 66. If one “pays a bet” knowingly, one must be unaware that one is giving money to 
another, or believe that one is giving money to another for some other reason—either of which, 
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easily facilitate another’s bookmaking unknowingly, for instance by 
leasing property to another without knowing of his bookmaking 
activity. 
Wac has become an oft-cited Ohio precedent for the rule that 
strict liability is “plainly indicated” when an offense includes a 
culpability term in one phrase of an offense but not in another phrase 
that specifies alternate conduct.67 Ohio appellate courts commonly 
find further support for “plain” indications of strict liability in familiar 
instrumental rationales, such as whether strict liability facilitates a 
criminal statute’s deterrence purpose. 
A recent strict-liability interpretation of Ohio’s aggravated 
robbery offense makes the point. The offense is defined as theft, 
which expressly requires knowledge, along with another element.68 In 
State v. Lester69 the issue was whether “the element of brandishing, 
displaying, using, or indicating possession of a deadly weapon has a 
mens rea of recklessness, or whether strict liability is imposed with 
regard to that element.”70 The Ohio Supreme Court in Lester held 
that it did not. After considering the code’s presumption of 
culpability in the absence of a mens rea term unless strict liability was 
“plainly indicated,” Lester concluded the indication was plain 
 
if true, presents an occasion for conviction of an actor for innocent conduct. The purpose of 
culpability requirements is precisely to draw those distinctions and prevent that risk. 
 67. See, e.g., State v. Parrish, 465 N.E.2d 873, 874–75 (Ohio 1984) (per curiam) (noting that 
Ohio courts have permitted strict liability when “the General Assembly has expressly 
differentiated degrees of culpability” in the definition of the offense); State v. Brewer, 645 
N.E.2d 120, 121–22 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“The rule of law emerging from those cases is that a 
statute that neither specifies that a particular mental state is necessary to commit the offense 
nor plainly states that no mental state is necessary to commit the offense may nevertheless 
plainly indicate a legislative intent to impose strict liability if the statute is structured so as to 
proscribe an act with ‘expressly differentiated degrees of culpability.’” (quoting Parrish, 465 
N.E.2d at 874–75)); State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“We reject [the 
defendant’s] argument that he must additionally know he was within one thousand feet of a 
school. The statute in question enhances the penalty when an additional element is proven and 
does not criminalize otherwise innocent behavior, as it applies only to people already in 
violation of a statute with a mens rea requirement.”); see also State v. Harris, 623 N.E.2d 1240, 
1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting Ohio’s strict-liability standard regarding drug offenses 
in school zones). 
 68. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.02 (West 2006) (stating that one must “knowingly 
obtain or exert control over . . . [another’s] property . . . [w]ithout the consent of the owner” and 
“with purpose to deprive the owner”). Ohio defines several other crimes as “[t]heft offense[s]” 
which can become robbery if committed with weapons. See id. § 2913.01(K)(1) (defining “[t]heft 
offense[s]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. §§ 2911.01 to -.02 (defining robbery and 
aggravated robbery as requiring commission of a “theft offense”). 
 69. State v. Lester, 916 N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 2009). 
 70. Id. at 1039 (interpreting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.01(A)(1) (West 2006)). 
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enough,71 although to do so the court failed to recognize that 
indicating possession and brandishing a weapon are verbs that imply 
intentional or knowing conduct as a matter of ordinary meaning. The 
court reasoned that the amendment of the offense to add the display 
and brandish terms does not establish “that the General Assembly 
intended to require a specific mental element”72—an analysis that 
Justice Lanzinger, concurring in the judgment only, argued displaced 
the requirement for plainly indicated strict liability with one requiring 
a plain indication for intent.73 The majority’s support cited previous 
strict-liability decisions including Wac,74 as well as common rationales 
used to infer strict liability. Lester invoked the instrumental rationale 
that the “risk of harm increases” from the conduct regardless of 
whether it is done knowingly.75 And, reflecting a common judicial 
rejection of the idea that culpability is linked proportionally to 
liability, the court noted that the “brandishing” element does not 
serve to distinguish innocent from culpable conduct, so “it is 
reasonable that the General Assembly would impose strict liability on 
the additional [element] that enhances the seriousness of the criminal 
activity.”76 The Ohio Supreme Court employed the same reasons 
more recently to affirm a strict-liability application of another clause 
 
 71. Id. at 1041–42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72. Id. at 1042. 
 73. Id. at 1046 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 74. Id. at 1047 (“[A] culpable mental state . . . [i]s an element of facilitating bookmaking. 
Nevertheless, there is no such requirement in the same subsection for bookmaking per se. This 
exclusion plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability . . . .” (quoting State v. 
Wac, 428 N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ohio 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Lester also relied 
on State v. Wharf, 715 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio 1999), which interpreted the weapon-possession 
element of the robbery statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(D)(1), as plainly indicating 
strict liability, see Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 175 (“[B]y employing language making mere possession 
or control . . . , as opposed to actual use or intent to use, a violation, it is clear to us that the 
General Assembly intended . . . a strict liability offense.”); see also Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1041–42 
(citing Wharf for the proposition that “[t]he element of having a deadly weapon in one’s 
possession or under one’s control . . . does not . . . require that a defendant act with a specific 
intent”). The Lester court’s misreading was facilitated by its failure to acknowledge that 
“possession” is defined in section 2901.21(D)(1) of the Ohio Code as requiring that one 
“knowingly procured or received the thing” (emphasis added).  
 75. Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1043 (“From the victim’s perspective, . . . the risk of harm 
increases when a defendant brandishes or displays the weapon.”). Wharf provides a more 
explicit instrumental rationale. See Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 175 (invoking the legislature’s implicit 
goal “to remove the potential for harm that exists” from weapon possession during thefts and 
noting that “[m]erely having the weapon is the potentially dangerous factual condition 
warranting the more severe penalty” (quoting State v. Edwards, 361 N.E.2d 1083, 1086 (1976))). 
 76. Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1042–43. 
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in the same statute.77 And one finds the same reliance on instrumental 
aims of protecting victims or reducing harm in other states’ strict-
liability interpretations, despite MPC-inspired culpability 
presumptions.78 
C. Limits on Culpability Presumptions (Part Two): Restrictive 
Application and Non-Acknowledgement 
Another set of strategies that facilitates strict liability despite 
MPC culpability presumptions merits note. One version occurred 
when the Ohio Court of Appeals, in Ward, paraphrased the MPC 
presumption with the proposition that the “legislature has attached 
criminal liability to criminal conduct without the requirement of a 
culpable mental state.”79 Sometimes courts mischaracterize, or 
perhaps misunderstand, mental-state presumptions in their state 
codes. But some courts simply ignore them. A Texas appellate 
decision, Massey v. State,80 provides a stark example of the latter 
tactic. In resolving the question of whether a sexual assault offense 
includes a mental-state requirement for the victim’s age element, 
which triggers a grade and sentence enhancement, the court made no 
reference at all to the Texas statutes that codify mens rea rules based 
on the MPC.81 Instead, it cited only a more attenuated authority from 
a jurisdiction without MPC presumptions—a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision interpreting a federal pornography offense—for the principle 
that “[a]n additional allegation of culpable mental state is not 
 
 77. See State v. Horner, 935 N.E.2d 26 (Ohio 2010) (interpreting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2911.01(A)(3) (West 2006)). In Horner, intentional injury would have been easy to prove. See 
id. at 29 (noting that the defendants “beat the victims and robbed them of cash”). Likewise, 
intent on the weapon elements would have been easy to prove in Wharf and Lester. Mr. Wharf 
pointed his rifle at the police before he was shot by them. Wharf, 715 N.E.2d at 173. Mr. Lester 
pointed a knife at a victim and said, “I will cut you.” Lester, 916 N.E.2d at 1039 (quoting Lester) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 78. See, e.g., Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 666–67 (Colo. 2000) (citing, inter alia, the 
statute’s purpose to protect victims as a reason not to infer a requirement that the defendant 
know a minor’s age in the offense of “contributing to the delinquency of a minor,” COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 18-6-701 (1999), although the court inferred a knowledge requirement for the conduct 
that constitutes “contributing to delinquency,” in this case facilitating illegal drug sales).  
 79. State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16, 19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
 80. Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). 
 81. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2011) (establishing the basic mens rea 
requirements); id. § 6.03 (defining culpable mental states). 
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required for such an aggravating element.”82  Massey is not singular in 
this respect.83 
Additionally, courts find more forceful ways to narrowly 
interpret culpability presumptions than in Denby,84 in which the 
court’s inference of clear legislative intent for strict liability did all of 
the work.85 Some courts define offense components with labels that 
make the presumptions inapplicable. This was the Illinois court’s 
tactic to reach the same strict-liability holding as Denby, Rutley, and 
Ward for the Illinois school-zone element of the drug offense. In 
People v. Pacheco,86 the Illinois appellate court’s analysis concluded 
that school proximity was not an element of the offense. It was instead 
“only an enhancing factor used to elevate the level of the felony to a 
Class 1 felony,”87 and the state code’s interpretive presumptions speak 
 
 82. Massey, 933 S.W.2d at 584 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 
72 n.3 (1994)). For a contrasting decision from another MPC state, see People v. Ryan, 626 
N.E.2d 51, 55 (N.Y. 1993), superseded by statute, Act of June 10, 1995, 1995 N.Y. Laws 2180 
(codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.18 (McKinney 2008)). Ryan relied on codified 
mens rea presumptions, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15 (McKinney 1992), to hold that an offense 
prohibiting knowing possession of 625 mg of a hallucinogen, id. § 220.18(5), requires proof that 
offender had knowledge of the weight of the drug—an element defined in a subsection of the 
law that increases the sentencing range, Ryan, 626 N.E.2d at 54–55; see also N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 220.18 (McKinney 2008) (specifying the circumstances under which “[a] person is guilty of 
criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree”). 
 83. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 963 A.2d 281 (N.J. 
2009), did not discuss section 2C:2-2 of the New Jersey Code, which requires a mental state for 
all terms unless contrary purpose plainly appears. Although noting that the firearm-possession 
statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3(d) (West 2007), is susceptible to “two plausible 
interpretations,” the court found that strict liability applied to the element that the gun be 
defaced, Smith, 963 A.2d at 285, 289. Similarly, State v. Baker, 636 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. 1982), did 
not discuss Missouri’s culpability presumption, MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021 (West 1978), in 
finding circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant knew the murder victim’s 
status as a law-enforcement officer; the court also declined to address “the unscrutable question 
of mens rea,” Baker, 636 S.W.2d at 907. Here, the jury was not instructed to find knowledge. Id.; 
see also Gluck, supra note 24, at 1787–91 (describing Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decisions 
that ignore and contradict other codified interpretive rules). 
 84. See, e.g., Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 666–67 (Colo. 2000) (declining to infer a mens 
rea requirement as to the victim’s age, but inferring it as to the conduct element).  
 85. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
 86. People v. Pacheco, 666 N.E.2d 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
 87. Id. at 376 (emphasis added); see also People v. Brooks, 648 N.E.2d 626, 628–30 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1995) (interpreting the drug offense statute for offenses committed within one 
thousand feet of public housing and holding that mental-state requirements do not extend to 
“[e]nhancing provisions” because they only “concern consequences of the offense which make 
[the offense] more serious”). Pacheco drew no inference from the fact that the basic drug 
offense is codified in one section of the Illinois Code, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 570/401 (West 
1994), whereas the enhancement (committing the offense near a school) is separately codified in 
section 570/407(b). 
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only to culpability requirements “with respect to each element 
described by the statute defining the offense.”88 The court embraced 
this approach more recently for another offense. In People v. 
Stanley,89 the statute read: “A person who possesses any firearm upon 
which any such importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number has been 
changed, altered, removed or obliterated commits a Class 3 felony.”90 
Stanley’s strained interpretation “discern[ed] that the elements of this 
offense are properly [1] the mens rea and [2] the 
possession . . . . Though the defacement unmistakably bears upon the 
commission of the offense, it is not an element of the offense.”91 
Although an “enhancing factor” is not used or defined in the Illinois 
penal code, this distinction between factors and elements, which 
limits culpability requirements to elements, has persisted.92 And it has 
done so despite the Illinois Supreme Court’s earlier holding that a 
 
  Some states expressly treat such aggravating facts as strict-liability sentencing factors, 
as Pennsylvania does with its school-zone drug offense, by placing the school-zone factor in its 
sentencing guidelines. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 780-113 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (defining 
drug offenses); 204 PA. CODE § 303.10 (2012) (providing for a sentence enhancement for 
offenses in school zones); see also Commonwealth v. Murphy, 592 A.2d 750, 754–55 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991) (holding that there is no mens rea requirement for proximity to a school zone because 
that fact is in the sentencing guidelines rather than the offense definition). The clarity of 
Pennsylvania’s grading and sentencing rule here says nothing about the soundness of its grading 
distinctions generally, which a careful study has ranked below average. See Paul H. Robinson, 
Michael T. Cahill & Usman Mohammad, The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal 
Codes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 51, 60 (ranking Pennsylvania’s code as below average in the 
“grading liability and punishment” category but “above average” in other categories). 
 88. Pacheco, 666 N.E.2d at 375 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/4-3(a) (West 1994)). 
 89. People v. Stanley, 921 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. Ct. App. 2010). 
 90. Id. at 451 (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-5(b) (West 2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id. at 454 (emphasis added); see also State v. Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 601, 607 (Ohio 2000) 
(holding that, for the offense of unlawful possession of dangerous ordnance, the state does not 
need to prove that the defendant knew that the shotgun’s barrel length was less than eighteen 
inches). 
 92. Although there is no reference to enhancing factors in the interpretive provisions or 
elsewhere in the Illinois penal code, a state supreme court rule refers to factors that enhance a 
sentence in a provision that defines sentencing procedures. See ILL. S. CT. R. 451(g) (“When the 
death penalty is not being sought and the State intends, for the purpose of sentencing, to rely on 
one or more sentencing enhancement factors . . . the court may, within its discretion, conduct a 
unitary trial through verdict on the issue of guilt and on the issue of whether a sentencing 
enhancement factor exists.”); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111-3(c) (West 2006 & 
Supp. 2012) (listing charging requirements for prosecutors pursuing enhanced sentences). For 
another example of an Illinois decision deciding whether an offense clause is an element or an 
enhancing factor, see People v. Zimmerman, 942 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 2010), which concluded that a 
clause in the statute defining the offense was an element and not a sentence-enhancement 
factor, id. at 1234. 
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fact that raised theft from a misdemeanor to a felony is an element of 
that offense, with the result that the government must prove that 
element at trial rather than merely address it in a sentencing hearing.93 
D. Counterexamples: Taking Culpability Presumptions Seriously 
Not every state court adopts rationales to avoid legislative 
codification of culpability presumptions. Some courts take the 
enactment of these provisions as indicating legislative preference for 
mental-state requirements, and they apply them even with respect to 
statutes whose language, structure, or implied purpose would support 
strict-liability holdings in other jurisdictions and under non-MPC 
interpretive conventions. Despite its strict-liability decision in Rutley 
on the school-zone drug offense, the Oregon Supreme Court earlier 
in State v. Blanton94 relied on presumptions in its state code to 
establish a culpability requirement to an age element in another drug 
offense.95 Moreover, it did so when the culpability term “knowingly” 
appeared in the statute’s first subsection and the minor’s age element 
was placed in the fourth,96 a structure that could be read to indicate 
strict liability. The separate age-element section increased the felony 
grade of the offense, but unlike Illinois and Ohio courts, Blanton 
inferred no distinction for “non-elements” or “enhancing factors.”97 
Its reasoning relied entirely on Oregon’s MPC-based statute, in which 
a “prescribed culpable mental state applies to each material element 
of the offense that necessarily requires a culpable mental state.”98 
Blanton found that the italicized clause (a revision of the MPC 
adopted by several states) to be “confusing” but concluded that 
 
 93. People v. Hicks, 518 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ill. 1987), superseded by statute, Public Act 86-
964, 1989 Ill. Laws 6509 (codified as amended at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/111-3 (West 2006 
& Supp. 2012)). 
 94. State v. Blanton, 588 P.2d 28, 29 (Or. 1978) (en banc). 
 95. Id. at 29–30. Blanton, age twenty-one, was accused of providing marijuana to a 
seventeen-year-old. Id. at 29. 
 96. Id. At the time of Blanton, the statute read: 
(1) A person commits the offense of criminal activity in drugs if he knowingly and 
unlawfully . . . furnishes . . . a narcotic or dangerous drug. 
(2) . . . [C]riminal activity in drugs is a Class B felony . . . . 
(4) . . . [I]f the defendant is 18 years of age or over and the conviction is for furnishing 
a narcotic or dangerous drug to a person under 18 years of age and who is at least 
three years younger than the defendant, criminal activity in drugs is a Class A felony. 
Act of Mar. 12, 1974, § 2, 1974 Or. Laws Spec. Sess. 167, 168 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 167.207 (1974)), repealed by Act effective July 1, 1978, 1977 Or. Laws 701. 
 97. See Blanton, 588 P.2d at 29–30. 
 98. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(1) (2011) (emphasis added). 
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culpability was “necessarily require[d]” for all elements save those for 
“jurisdiction, venue and the like”99—a reading that strengthens the 
provision’s presumption for mental-state requirements. Instead of 
emphasizing an instrumental protective purpose from the offense 
definition, Blanton emphasized the legislative intent of the MPC-
based culpability presumption, which it read as displacing the 
common-law canon actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. “A policy 
against criminal liability without fault need not go so far as to protect 
a culpable defendant from an unanticipated extent of liability,” the 
court reasoned, but “the policy adopted by the legislature is to 
require a culpable mental state with respect to each element in the 
definition of an offense.”100 Much more recently, the Oregon appellate 
court read another youth-endangerment drug crime the same way.101 
A few other states had done so in the pre-MPC era.102 
One MPC jurisdiction did the same even with its school-zone 
drug offense. Missouri codifies the school-zone element in a separate 
section from the basic drug offense and lacks an express culpability 
term: 
A person commits the offense [as prohibited in another section] of 
distribution of a controlled substance near schools if such person 
violates section 195.211 by unlawfully distributing or delivering any 
controlled substance to a person in or on, or within two thousand 
feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary 
or secondary school, public vocational school, or a public or private 
community college, college or university or on any school bus.103 
 
 99. Blanton, 588 P.2d at 29 (quoting State v. Blanton, 570 P.2d 411, 413 (Or. Ct. App. 
1977), aff’d, 588 P.2d 28 (Or. 1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a later decision, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals was more blunt, labeling the clause “gibberish.” State v. Rutley, 123 
P.3d 334, 335 (Or. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 171 P.3d 361 (Or. 2007). 
 100. Blanton, 588 P.2d at 29. 
 101. See State v. Dixon, 83 P.3d 385, 387–88 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that mens rea 
applies to age in section 163.175(1) of the Oregon Code, which specifies liability for one who 
“knowingly . . . [p]ermits a person under 18 years of age to enter or remain in a place where 
unlawful activity involving controlled substances is maintained or conducted”). But see State v. 
Rainoldi, 268 P.3d 568, 579 (Or. 2011) (en banc) (reversing the court below by holding that 
proof of the defendant’s culpability regarding his felony status was not required). 
 102. See Kourie, supra note 23, § 4[b] (citing the following cases as requiring mens rea for 
the age of the victim: Chambers v. State, 215 N.E.2d 544 (Ind. 1966); State v. Friedman, 74 
N.E.2d 285 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1947); McGowan v. State, 173 P.2d 227 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947), 
rev’d on reh’g, 176 P.2d 837 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947); and Gottlieb v. Commonwealth, 101 S.E. 
872 (Va. 1920)). 
 103. MO. ANN. STAT. § 195.214 (West 2011).  A violation raises the basic offense from a 
class B to a class A felony. For the basic class B drug offense, see id. § 195.211.  
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The Missouri Court of Appeals in State v. White104 found the 
mens rea question settled by the state’s MPC-based statute that 
directs, “[I]f the definition of any offense does not expressly prescribe 
a culpable mental state for any elements of the offense, a culpable 
mental state is nonetheless required and is established if a person acts 
purposely or knowingly.”105 That command, the court held, meant the 
state must prove a defendant’s mental state as to the school-zone 
element.106 It continued, “[I]n order for a defendant to be found 
guilty . . . , he must have acted purposely or knowingly. A person acts 
‘knowingly’ . . . when, concerning his conduct or attendant 
circumstances, he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that those 
circumstances exist.”107 The legislature’s placement of the basic 
offense and school-zone enhancement in separate sections did not 
affect the court’s mens rea analysis. Neither did the statute’s purpose 
to protect youth from drug markets, nor did the culpability 
provision’s failure to specify that implicit mental-state requirements 
apply to all elements just as explicit ones do. Missouri’s 
interpretation, however, is a singular outlier for these school-zone 
drug statutes.108 Apparently no other state, MPC or non-MPC, has 
interpreted a similar drug offense to require proof of mens rea as to 
school proximity.109 
 
 104. State v. White, 28 S.W.3d 391 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), mandate recalled by 70 S.W.2d 644 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 105. Id. at 396 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 562.021(3) (1999) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The Missouri statute also dictates that “reckless or criminally negligent acts do not 
establish such culpable mental state.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021(3) (West 2012). This statute is 
based on MPC § 2.02(3), see supra note 18, but departs from it by defining the minimum 
culpability to be inferred as knowledge rather than recklessness. 
 106. White, 28 S.W.3d at 396 (discussing the culpability requirements as they apply to the 
offense of distributing a controlled substance in school zone, MO. REV. STAT. § 195.214 (1999)).  
 107. Id. at 396 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 562.016(3) (1999)); see also State v. Crooks, 64 
S.W.3d 887, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that, with regard to the same statute, “the state 
must prove that . . . the sale was within 2000 feet of a school” and that this sale was completed 
“knowingly with regard to all of the facts and circumstances”). 
 108. For more on Missouri courts’ interpretation of mens rea requirements, including a 
discussion of recent changes, see generally Wyrsch & Cook, supra note 23. For Oregon, in 
addition to Rutley, see State v. Jones, 196 P.3d 97 (Or. Ct. App. 2008), which “conclude[d] that 
the legislature did not intend to require the state to prove a defendant’s intent to steal property 
worth at least $750 in order to convict him of first-degree theft,” id. at 102. 
 109. The Washington Supreme Court, however, has held that its state statute requires proof 
of a culpable mental state when the school has an educational program on an upper floor of a 
commercial building with no public indication of its status as a school. See State v. Akers, 965 
P.2d 1078, 1079 (Wash. 1998) (“[T]he State’s evidence was insufficient to show that [defendant] 
had a readily ascertainable means of determining that he was in a school zone at the time of the 
drug transaction . . . .”). In other applications, Washington’s statute does not require mens rea. 
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More broadly, Oregon and Missouri are outliers in the degree to 
which MPC presumptions lead them to avoid strict-liability 
holdings.110 Despite a few strong applications of MPC culpability rules 
elsewhere,111 state court interpretations of mental-state requirements 
under MPC rules mostly go the other way. Two primary impressions 
emerge from this survey of case law in MPC states. One is that, as an 
analytical matter, legislative specifications of culpability presumptions 
have not simplified statutory construction by displacing judicial use of 
other interpretive canons on mens rea questions. The second 
conclusion is more substantive: MPC-inspired statutory presumptions 
have proven to be weak mechanisms for shifting courts away from 
inferring strict liability in criminal offenses, even for elements that are 
the sole basis for increasing the felony offense grade and punishment 
severity. 
E. Reasons for the Weak Effect of Culpability Presumptions 
1.  Legislative Drafting. Before taking a closer look at state MPC-
based statutes for more explanations of this trend, there are a couple 
of reasons for the modest effect—or in some settings the failure—of 
the MPC culpability provisions. One is a product of legislative choice: 
state legislatures commonly have failed to follow MPC drafting 
conventions for crime definitions in the wake of adopting MPC 
general provisions on culpability in their codes. As a result, state 
offense definitions often are less clear than the MPC as to whether 
mental-state requirements apply to certain elements, especially those 
 
See State v. Johnson, 68 P.3d 290, 295 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (“The statute provides that it is no 
defense to a prosecution for violation of the statute that the defendant is unaware the 
prohibited activity occurred inside a drug free zone.”); State v. Davis, 970 P.2d 336, 338 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] defendant’s knowledge of a school bus stop location is not required; 
rather, the mere existence of the stop is sufficient to warrant the sentencing enhancement.”). On 
the overwhelming trend to interpret such statutes without mens rea on the proximity element, 
see Bateman, supra note 23, §§ 6, 31, 31.5. One state, South Carolina, amended its statute in 
2010 expressly to add a knowledge requirement. See Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing 
Reform Act of 2010, No. 273, § 39, 2010 S.C. Acts 1937, 2009 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
53-445(B) (Supp. 2011)) (“For a person to be convicted of an offense pursuant to subsection 
(A), the person must: (1) have knowledge that he is in, on, or within a one-half mile radius of 
the grounds of a public or private elementary, middle, or secondary school . . . .”). 
 110. Oregon, however, has at least one decision to the contrary. See State v. Rainoldi, 268 
P.3d 568, 579 (Or. 2011) (en banc) (holding that proof of the defendant’s culpability regarding 
his felony status was not required). 
 111. New York may be another state in which MPC-based culpability presumptions have a 
notable effect on state-court decisions. See supra note 82.  
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in separate subsections.112 Poor drafting makes a state’s culpability 
provisions harder to apply;113 courts are less confident that exceptions 
will be truly explicit, so they resort more readily to common-law 
interpretive canons in search of statutory meaning and set a lower bar 
for “plain” indications of strict liability. Furthermore, some MPC 
states, including Ohio and Illinois, did not adopt the MPC provision 
that specifies how culpability requirements apply to grading 
elements,114 which may give their courts further basis to invoke a 
traditional convention that mens rea does not attach to an 
“aggravating element” or “enhancing factor.” This convention may 
undermine the basic code provisions defining a presumption of mens 
rea in the absence of any such term. 
The last point supports a broader observation: even MPC-
influenced legislatures that enacted the primary culpability 
presumptions may be neither as fully committed to mens rea 
requirements for all offense elements as codification of those 
presumptions might suggest, nor as committed to that position as 
advocates of the correspondence principle and the MPC are. Even 
when a legislature adopts these key provisions from the MPC, it does 
so in the context of a preexisting body of interpretive law and 
substantive criminal law.115 MPC adoptions often occur without 
accompanying codification of all supporting provisions in the MPC, 
 
 112. For detailed accounts of haphazard, ambiguous, and inconsistent offense drafting in the 
wake of a state’s earlier MPC-based revision of its criminal code, see generally Paul H. 
Robinson, Thomas Gaeta, Matthew Majarian, Megan Schultz & Douglas M. Weck, The Modern 
Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709 (2010), which examines the Pennsylvania Code, and ILL. CRIM. 
CODE REWRITE & REFORM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE 
REWRITE AND REFORM COMMISSION (2003), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/ 
phrobins/ illinois/IL%20final%20report%20Vol1.pdf, which examines the Illinois Code. For an 
example of the MPC’s clarity in defining mens rea across a statute with multiple subsections, see 
its definition of “theft by deception,” which requires a culpable mental state of “purposely” in 
the chapeau of the offense definition, thus applying it to the four subsections that follow. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (Official Draft 1985). 
 113. Part of the blame might be the ALI’s: the MPC contains no model offenses for drug 
crimes. 
 114. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(2) (“[I]gnorance or mistake of the defendant shall 
reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which [the defendant] may be convicted to those 
of the offense of which [the defendant] would be guilty had the situation been as [the defendant] 
supposed.”). 
 115. Some states revised many of their specific crime definitions when they took up MPC-
inspired code revision projects, but many took a more piecemeal approach. All state criminal 
codes later added many more crimes than the MPC contains, including in many areas that the 
MPC did not contemplate, most notably drug crimes. 
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such as the grading-elements provision.116 Furthermore, a culpability 
presumption in a real-world setting may legitimately be understood to 
mean something different from the same provision in the MPC itself. 
One reason for the modest influence of MPC-based culpability 
presumptions in state codes, then, may be that their adoption, without 
further and continuing indications of legislative commitment to their 
motivating principles, is an insufficient signal of a state’s commitment 
to the MPC’s culpability premises, particularly the proportional link 
of punishment to individual fault.117 These indications of a 
legislature’s commitment to the strength of its own MPC 
presumptions draw additional support, as described more in the next 
Part, from many states’ revisions of the MPC’s formulation of the 
general-part culpability rules. 
2.  Judicial Role—Inferring Intent Versus Enforcing Prior 
Commitments. Conventions of statutory interpretation reflect a 
particular vision of how courts should defer to the democratic 
legitimacy of legislatures. Traditional canons mostly aim to help 
courts determine and facilitate legislative intent even when intent is 
not clear. That vision of legislative deference entails a weaker 
presumption in favor of culpability requirements than the MPC 
provisions do.118 In deferring to legislatures, courts making every 
 
 116. I identified code sections equivalent to the MPC grading provision in only three of the 
twenty-four MPC states. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-211 (LexisNexis 2007) (“When the 
grade or class of a particular offense depends on whether it is committed intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, its grade or class shall be the lowest for which the 
determinative state of mind is established with respect to any element of the offense.”); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(e) (West 2005) (containing equivalent language); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.08.010(3) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (same). 
 117. Courts sometimes note legislative acquiescence to judicial interpretations of statutes. 
See, e.g., State v. Smith, 963 A.2d 281, 285 (N.J. 2009) (“When, after a long period, the 
Legislature does not act to amend a statute to contradict our interpretation, then we may 
presume its acquiescence to the construction given to the provision.”). 
 118. The primary interpretive rules in favor of mens rea terms include the presumption that 
crimes require some “union of act and intent,” see generally LAFAVE,  supra note 18, § 6.3(a) 
(“With those crimes which require some mental fault (whether intention, knowledge, 
recklessness, or negligence) in addition to an act or omission, it is a basic premise of Anglo-
American criminal law that the physical conduct and the state of mind must concur.”); that strict 
liability is generally limited to “public welfare” or “regulatory” offenses, see United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (“[The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 653, 52 
Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301–392 (1940))] dispenses with the conventional 
requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger 
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in 
responsible relation to a public danger.”); and that statutes codifying common-law crimes 
implicitly require the mens rea required at common law, see Morissette v. United States, 342 
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effort to determine a statute’s intended meaning set a comparatively 
low bar for how clear a legislature’s rejection of a mens rea 
presumption must be, because courts might be confident that they can 
determine intent even when it is not clear. 
By contrast, codification of mens rea presumptions should 
strengthen an inference of culpability requirements in ambiguous 
statutes and lead courts to require greater drafting clarity before 
finding that legislators intended to reject that presumption in a 
particular code section—more clarity than courts were able to find in 
decisions like Denby, Rutley, or Ward when using traditional canons. 
The New Jersey statute is an example of the clarity courts could 
require to avoid the general presumption of mens rea.119 By requiring 
greater clarity, courts’ interpretive process should serve to discipline 
legislative drafting and thereby reduce ambiguity regarding legislative 
intent. Requiring greater clarity would also hold the legislature to its 
own prior, codified commitment for culpability requirements for all 
offense elements, unless clearly rejected in a particular instance.120 
MPC-inspired mens rea rules, in short, shift the institutional role 
of courts in the statutory-interpretation process. Under such rules, 
courts defer to legislatures not by making all efforts to infer intended 
meaning from particular offense definitions but by adhering to the 
legislature’s general presumption of mens rea for all elements, as well 
as holding the legislature itself to that presumption. As the MPC 
intended, this approach would simplify judicial interpretation and 
make statutory meaning clearer and more predictable. Explanations 
for why many courts have not embraced this role, as discussed in Part 
IV, include the normative appeal of the strict-liability outcomes 
reached through traditional interpretive canons and courts’ 
tendencies to join (or inability to resist) the political trend of the last 
generation toward harsher criminal law. In some MPC states, 
however, a simpler explanation may share some credit: the next Part 
surveys the explicit choices that many MPC-inspired legislatures 
made to retain strict liability and weaken general presumptions for 
culpability requirements. 
 
U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (“As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments 
were silent on the subject [of mens rea], their courts assumed that the omission did not signify 
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the 
offense that it required no statutory affirmation.”). 
 119. See supra note 37. 
 120. Although, again, how strongly one can infer this dictate from a legislature’s adoption of 
MPC provisions is debatable.  
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II.  LEGISLATIVE SUPPORT FOR STRICT LIABILITY 
Part II takes a closer look at variations among the twenty-four 
MPC states in their legislative commitment to the correspondence 
principle.  It does so by highlighting several statutory departures from 
the MPC version of mens rea presumptions.121  Although many states 
revised the MPC’s language when adopting provisions for their own 
codes, only a few states adopted the MPC’s culpability provisions 
nearly verbatim.122 Many states’ language modifications are not 
substantive. I categorize twelve of the twenty-four as strong MPC 
states because their codes include substantive equivalents to the 
MPC’s presumption of mens rea when a crime definition lacks an 
explicit mental-state term and the presumption that express terms 
apply to all offense elements. The other half of MPC states either lack 
a statute codifying one of these presumptions or (in two cases, 
Arizona and Colorado) notably weaken the mens rea inference in the 
absence of an explicit requirement. In what follows, I identify and 
distinguish some of the most common and substantial alternatives or 
omissions regarding mens rea presumptions. I then highlight state 
codes that explicitly expand applications of strict liability in specific 
statutes, so as to trump any general presumption of a culpability 
requirement. 
A. State Revisions to the MPC Culpability Presumptions 
The most notable means by which MPC states weaken mens rea 
requirements in comparison to the MPC is by failing to adopt one of 
the two presumptions for culpability requirements. Holding aside the 
twelve strongest states, which do include both provisions,123 two others 
 
 121. The relevant MPC provisions remain § 2.02(3), § 2.02(4), and § 2.02(1). See supra note 
9. 
 122. Examples of codes that are the closest to the MPC include DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§§ 243–264 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-204, -207 (LexisNexis 2007); and 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103, 302, 305 (West 1998 & Supp. 2012). 
 123. ALA. CODE § 13A-2 to -4(b) (LexisNexis 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-2-203(a)–(b),     
-204 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 243–264 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 702-204,        
-207 (LexisNexis 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3, 5/4-9 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-5202 (Supp. 2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.026(2) (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-02-02 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.105(1) (2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(d) 
(West 1998). 
  Ohio’s provision, however, lacks MPC § 2.02(4)’s clear direction that express mental-
state requirements presumptively apply to all elements, substituting instead language that “[t]he 
person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental 
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(Arizona and Colorado) codify both presumptions but explicitly 
weaken the presumption of mens rea when an offense includes no 
express culpability term.124 The remaining ten states lack any version 
of one of the two MPC presumptions. Five of the remaining states 
include only the presumption to imply mens rea when no such term is 
included in an offense; they do not have any equivalent to MPC 
§ 2.02(4)’s presumption that an express mens rea term applies to all 
elements of the offense unless a statute clearly specifies otherwise.125 
Four states do the opposite: they include a presumption that express 
terms apply to all elements but fail to dictate a presumption of mens 
rea when no mens rea term is present.126 Finally, Kentucky stands 
alone among the twenty-four, arguably such that it should not be 
counted as an MPC state: it lacks any presumption about the reach of 
express mens rea terms and includes only a weak presumption for 
mens rea when no term is apparent.127 These groups are summarized 
in Table 2.   
 
state is specified by the section defining the offense.” OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.21(A)(2) (West 
2006) (emphasis added). 
 124. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-202(B) (2010) (“If a statute defining an offense does not 
expressly prescribe a culpable mental state that is sufficient for commission of the offense, no 
culpable mental state is required for the commission of such offense, and the offense is one of 
strict liability unless the proscribed conduct necessarily involves a culpable mental state. If the 
offense is one of strict liability, proof of a culpable mental state will also suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2) (2012) (“Although no culpable 
mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may 
nevertheless be required for the commission of that offense, or with respect to some or all of the 
material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culpable mental 
state.”). 
 125. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.610 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE § 2901.21(B) (West 2006); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-11-301 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 126. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-2 (d) 
(LexisNexis 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 17-A, § 34 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:2 
(LexisNexis 2007). 
 127. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.030(2) (West 2006) (“A person is not guilty of a 
criminal offense unless . . . [h]e has engaged in such conduct intentionally, knowingly, wantonly 
or recklessly as the law may require, with respect to each element of the offense . . . .”); id. 
§ 501.040 (noting that offenses lacking an express mental-state requirement “may” require 
culpability for “some or all of the material elements”); see also Saxton v. Commonwealth, 315 
S.W.3d 293, 299 (Ky. 2010) (interpreting the latter statute to mean that “even within the Penal 
Code, there is recognition that a culpable mental state may not be required as to an element of 
the offense”). 
  The Connecticut legislature’s official Comment attached to section 53a-5 of the 
Connecticut Code states that “whether a mental state is required is a question of statutory 
construction, depending on the general scope of the act and the nature of the evils to be 
avoided.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-5 cmt. (1971). 
BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2012  10:02 AM 
2012] PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY 319 
  Table 2. 
Strongest  Equivalent to MPC 
presumptions for 
express mens rea 
terms; 
 Presumption to imply 
missing mens rea terms 
Twelve: Alabama, 
Arkansas, Delaware, 
Illinois, Hawaii, Kansas, 
Missouri, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania 
Strong 
 
  
 Presumption for 
express terms; 
 Weak presumption to 
imply missing terms 
 
 
Two: Arizona, Colorado 
 
Moderate  Presumption to imply 
missing terms; 
 No presumption for 
express terms 
 
 
Five: Alaska, Ohio, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah 
 
Moderate  Presumption for 
express terms; 
 No presumption to 
imply missing terms 
 
 
Four: Connecticut, 
Indiana, Maine, New 
Hampshire 
 
Weakest  No presumption for 
express terms; 
 Weak presumption to 
imply missing terms  
 
 
One: Kentucky 
 
The language by which some states weaken the implication of 
mens rea bears note. Arizona, Colorado, and Kentucky all employ 
the same alternative provision that explicitly preserves the legitimacy 
of strict-liability offenses. Colorado’s substitute for MPC § 2.02(3) 
reads: 
Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated[,] . . . a 
culpable mental state may nevertheless be required . . . with respect 
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to some or all of the material elements . . . , if the proscribed conduct 
necessarily involves such a culpable mental state.128 
Several other states employ effectively the same language but 
then also strengthen the presumption for mens rea by specifying that 
legislative intent for strict liability must be clear or plain. Alabama’s 
version is representative. Following language similar to Colorado’s, it 
adds: “A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative 
intent to impose strict liability, states a crime of mental culpability.”129  
I coded these states with these provisions as adopting a strong 
presumption to imply mens rea, but this alternative language seems to 
be open to more ambiguity than the MPC: courts might view strict 
liability as not “clearly indicated” in a given offense yet also not find 
culpability to be “necessarily involved” in some element. Even under 
the MPC’s clearer language, courts find the need for common-law 
interpretive canons to resolve whether strict liability is plainly 
intended for a given offense.130  
Many MPC states departed from the MPC culpability template 
in other ways that are not critical to emphasize here.131 The point to 
take is that even in the twenty-four states broadly categorized as MPC 
jurisdictions, roughly half of the state courts start with some 
 
 128. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-503(2) (2012) (emphasis added); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-202(B) (2010) (containing language identical to the Colorado statute); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 501.040 (West 2006) (same). Given the wording of the Colorado statute, a 
decision such as Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662 (Colo. 2000), has a more plausible claim of 
adhering to legislative intent. See supra notes 78, 84. 
 129. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (emphasis added); see also N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) (West 2005) (employing equivalent language); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.15(2) 
(McKinney 2009) (same); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02(b) (West 2011) (same); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008) (same). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21(B) (West 
2006) (“When the section defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and 
plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the 
section, then culpability is not required . . . .”). 
 130. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 15 A.3d 865, 870–72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (using 
plain language and legislative history to conclude that the legislature intended a strict-liability 
element in the child-endangerment statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West 2005)). Oregon’s 
code also employs the “necessarily required” language to restrict application of explicit terms, 
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(1)–(2) (2011), but, as noted above, its supreme court reduced that 
route for strict liability, see supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. 
 131. For example, Missouri and New Jersey made knowledge, rather than recklessness, the 
standard to imply in statutes lacking a mental-state term. MO. ANN. STAT. § 562.021(3) (West 
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2(c)(3) (West 2005). Oregon did the opposite, allowing mere 
negligence to be the inferred culpability level. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.115(1), (2) (2011). The sole 
Texas provision governing mens rea specifies a culpability presumption for conduct but does not 
mention result or circumstance elements. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02 (West 2011). 
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indications from their legislatures—sometimes modest, sometimes 
substantial—that strict-liability elements or offenses are more likely 
to be found in the state code than in those states that fully codified 
the MPC culpability presumptions. This variation explains little of the 
trend of state decisions surveyed in Part I. The Connecticut court in 
Denby, for example, declined to extend an express mens rea term to a 
statutory element even though Connecticut’s code includes the 
MPC’s culpability presumptions. And Ohio’s long line of strict-
liability interpretations is governed by that state’s strong presumption 
to imply missing mens rea terms; the absence of a presumption to 
extend express terms to all elements did not matter in most of those 
decisions.132 Nonetheless, the statutory variation does not seem to 
fully account for variations in judicial interpretations. Ohio’s long 
record of strict-liability decisions is probably more extensive than its 
MPC modifications require. The Oregon code’s departures from the 
MPC example are greater than in some states, yet its courts have a 
comparatively strong record of inferring culpability requirements; the 
same is probably true of New York. 
B. Other Legislative Approval of Strict Liability 
Legislatures endorse strict liability not only by enacting weaker 
alternatives to the MPC culpability canons or by acquiescing to state 
court strict-liability interpretations. They also do so by enacting 
specific strict-liability rules. Kansas, Minnesota, New York, and 
Wisconsin each have a general statute dictating that “[c]riminal intent 
does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even 
though age is a material element in the crime in question.”133 New 
 
 132. On the other hand, Colorado’s weak version of a presumption to imply missing mens 
rea terms plausibly helps explain the decision in Gorman. In that case, the court inferred a 
knowledge requirement for one element but not another. See supra notes 78, 84. A stronger 
presumption could have led to a holding that knowledge was required for both—although case 
law in other states, such as Ohio, shows that adoption of a stronger presumption does not 
necessarily stop courts from readily inferring strict liability in comparable settings. 
 133. MINN. STAT. § 609.02(9) (2009); WIS. STAT. § 939.23(6) (2005); see also KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-5204(b) (Supp. 2011) (“Proof of a culpable mental state does not require 
proof . . . that the accused had knowledge of the age of a minor, even though age is a material 
element of the crime with which the accused is charged.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(3) 
(McKinney 2009) (“[K]nowledge by the defendant of the age of [a] child is not an element of 
any . . . offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense . . . that the defendant did 
not know the age of the child . . . .”). The Kansas statute survived the state’s MPC-based code 
revision in 2011. See JOHN W. WHITE & BRETT WATSON, KAN. CRIMINAL CODE 
RECODIFICATION COMM’N, 2010 FINAL REPORT TO THE KANSAS LEGISLATURE 21–23 (2010), 
available at http://www.kansasjudicialcouncil.org/Documents/Studies%20and%20Reports/ 
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York has a similar statute stating that proof of a defendant’s 
knowledge regarding the weight of illegal drugs is never required.134 
And legislatures sometimes make strict liability truly explicit in 
particular offense definitions; the New Jersey statute noted above, 
specifying strict liability on the school-zone element of drug offenses, 
is one example.135 The New Jersey legislature, in fact, adds express 
strict-liability components to many offense definitions—some of 
which trigger substantial punishment increases,136 including a notable 
(or notorious) strict-liability homicide offense.137 And it has done so 
even though it also enacted strong culpability presumptions that track 
closely the original MPC language.138 Pennsylvania, a state that 
 
2010% 20Reports/Recodification%20Final%20Report.pdf (citing the MPC in a discussion of 
changes to culpability provisions of the Kansas Code). For a survey of states with similar rules 
regarding age elements in statutory rape offenses, see Carpenter, supra note 23, at 385–91. The 
MPC has a comparable, but much more limited, general rule on the invalidity a minor’s consent. 
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11(3) (Official Draft 1985) (“[A]ssent does not constitute consent 
if . . . it is given by a person who by reason of youth . . . is manifestly unable or known by the 
actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmlessness of the 
conduct . . . .”). For an example of an MPC offense to which the rule dictating strict liability for 
age elements would apply, see id. § 213.1(1), which defines rape. 
 134. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20(4) (McKinney 2009). 
 135. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-7 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012); see also supra note 37 and 
accompanying text. 
 136. New Jersey offenses with strict-liability elements include: N.J. STAT. ANN.            
§ 2C:11-4(a)(2) (West 2005) (providing for strict liability as to manslaughter caused “while 
fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer”); id. § 2C:11-5.1 (stating that 
knowledge of death is not an element of the crime of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle 
accident causing death); id. § 2C:12-1(b)(6), (b)(8), (f) (requiring no mens rea for certain 
circumstances constituting aggravated assault); id. § 2C:12-3(a) (specifying that, with respect to 
the offense of making terroristic threats during an emergency, the existence of emergency is a 
strict-liability element); id. § 2C:20-25(h) (requiring no knowledge or intent with respect to 
whether an entity is a public agency for computer-related theft from a public agency); id. 
§ 2C:21-22 (mandating that “caus[ing] injury to another” is a strict-liability element of the 
offense of unauthorized practice of law); id. § 2C:24-4(6) (providing for strict liability as to the 
child’s age for the offense of endangering the welfare of children by engaging in sexual acts); id. 
§ 2C:33-3(d) (stating that strict liability applies to the emergency component of triggering false 
public alarms during an emergency); id. § 2C:35-6 (mandating strict liability as to the minor’s 
age for the offense of involving a minor in drug activity); id. § 2C:38-5(b)(2) (providing support 
to terrorist groups is a strict-liability offense as to the group’s status as a terrorist organization). 
 137. See id. § 2C:35-9 (mandating homicide liability for drug sellers if their buyers die from 
voluntarily ingesting the drugs); see also State v. Rodriguez, 645 A.2d 1165, 1176 (N.J. 1994) 
(affirming a conviction under the statute after victims voluntarily ingested the drugs). For a 
similar statute and affirmation of a conviction, see MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.317a (2004); and 
People v. Liddell, No. 2007-214278-FC, 2009 WL 529840, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2009). 
For a harsh criticism of such statutes, see HUSAK, supra note 6, at 45–54, 74–75. 
 138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2(c) (West 2005). Strong general presumptions are not 
inconsistent, of course, with clearly specified exceptions. 
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adopted the MPC culpability rules nearly verbatim, added strict-
liability elements, including in the school-zone element of its drug 
offense, in a different way—by shifting some result and circumstance 
elements into its sentencing guidelines, where they are treated as 
strict-liability sentencing factors rather than offense elements.139 With 
respect to the clarity of legislative intent, at least, these two states are 
salutary models. Courts start with clear instructions not to infer strict 
liability unless such legislative intent is plain, and the legislatures 
provide plenty of examples of very explicit strict-liability elements. 
That combination should keep courts from too readily inferring, 
through non-MPC interpretive canons, strict liability in offenses 
without explicit language. 
If courts nonetheless infer strict liability too easily,140 it may be 
because courts take a signal from the legislature’s repeated use of 
strict liability. Perhaps courts infer that strict-liability provisions 
adopted after the enactment of culpability presumptions indicate 
greater legislative acceptance of strict liability over time and a weaker 
commitment to ensuring that punishment is allocated proportionately 
to culpability. And rather than adhering to a judicial role that 
enforces the legislature’s prior commitments to general presumptions 
save for clearly specified exceptions, courts shift to a role in which 
they infer and facilitate a diminished legislative acceptance for the 
correspondence principle throughout a broad range of statutes. 
III. THE ALTERNATIVE TO PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY:                    
STRICT LIABILITY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CULPABLE CONDUCT 
A. The Implicit Parameters of Strict Criminal Liability 
The foregoing presents a picture of much wider adoption of strict 
liability in MPC states than one would expect from the MPC itself. 
The prevalence of strict liability is a result of choices by both 
legislatures and courts. Many legislatures signaled their disagreement 
with the MPC from the beginning by enacting revisions that weaken 
the critical presumption of mental-state terms attached to every 
element. Those that did not adopt such revisions often imposed strict 
liability in other ways. 
 
 139. For a discussion of Pennsylvania law, see supra note 87. 
 140. See supra notes 58, 130. 
BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2012  10:02 AM 
324 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:285 
Working from their legislatures’ MPC-inspired reforms—and 
often going farther than those statutory provisions require—many 
state courts have shown a notable and consistent willingness to infer 
legislative preference for strict liability. As a matter of judicial 
practice, the MPC provisions have not changed courts’ statutory-
interpretation methods as much as its supporters undoubtedly hoped. 
The exception for strict liability when intent for it “plainly appears” 
has proven to be a more frequently invoked rationale on which to 
infer strict liability than the MPC drafters intended. Even when 
applying the strong culpability presumptions found in many state 
codes, courts regularly invoke strict liability through other 
interpretive conventions—textual meaning, sentence and code-
section structure, implicit statutory purposes, predicted effects, and 
the force of prior judicial decisions. Courts have generally declined to 
use the MPC canons as a reason to demand that legislatures express 
strict liability in the incontrovertibly clear terms that the New Jersey 
legislature frequently does. Instead, judges assume the role of quasi 
partners of legislators and search for subtle indications of intended 
strict liability in statutory language, even when that intent is far from 
plain. 
The evidence allows this conclusion: even after the enactment of 
express culpability presumptions, courts and legislatures in those 
states mostly remain uncommitted to the correspondence principle as 
a core premise of criminal law. State adoption of MPC-based code 
reforms should not be taken as a signal that states thereby committed 
their criminal-justice systems to the premise that punishment is 
justified only in proportion to liability. Instead, courts in many states 
continue to give mens rea and proof of fault a more restricted role: 
proof of culpability as to some initial offense or core conduct 
element—some threshold that separates innocent actors from guilty 
ones—is morally sufficient. Contemporary criminal law is 
characterized neither by Coke’s unlawful act theory,141 nor by the 
MPC’s position, the correspondence principle. The premise of 
contemporary criminal law is somewhere in between. 
The prevailing principle, which courts do little to elaborate, is 
suggested by the rationale that judges regularly invoke for strict-
liability interpretations. The principle is the idea that no proof of 
culpability is required beyond that needed to ensure that an actor is 
 
 141. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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not convicted for purely innocent conduct.142 This view describes 
much of what legislatures and courts widely take as the normatively 
acceptable, and preferable, relationship of punishment to culpability. 
The purpose of culpability is primarily, and often exclusively, to 
distinguish innocent actors from guilty ones. 
State and federal courts frequently cite the U.S. Supreme Court 
for this point. Relying on United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,143 
courts emphasize “the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement 
should apply to each of the statutory elements [of an offense] that 
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct”144—but no elements beyond 
those. Once proof of culpability reveals that a defendant is not an 
innocent actor, the essential work of mental-state requirements is 
done. Mens rea need not attach to other elements that serve only to 
enhance liability, from a lesser to a greater offense level, or that only 
serve to trigger greater punishment. Elements that merely distinguish 
greater from lesser offenses, or greater from lesser sentences, need no 
justification from proof of culpability to do that work. Those 
distinctions can be justified on grounds unrelated to moral fault. 
Relying on the common judicial formulation, this may be called the 
“otherwise innocent” principle. Alternately, it can be understood as a 
principle of “threshold culpability”: once an actor crosses the 
threshold from innocent to culpable, requirements for mens rea proof 
diminish.145 
The Illinois Court of Appeals in People v. Brooks146 provided a 
typical statement: “Once the legislature has determined that certain 
conduct is criminal, it need not require the State to prove a 
 
 142. See, e.g., In re C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2000) (“[G]reat care is taken to avoid 
interpreting statutes as eliminating mens rea where doing so criminalizes a broad range of what 
would otherwise be innocent conduct.”); State v. Lester, 916 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Ohio 2009) 
(“When the additional fact makes innocent conduct criminal, . . . it is unlikely that the General 
Assembly ‘plainly intended’ to impose strict liability.”). 
 143. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). 
 144. Id. at 72 (emphasis added). Similarly, Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985), 
noted the particular care that the Supreme Court has taken to avoid construing a statute to 
dispense with mens rea where doing so would “criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent 
conduct,” id. at 426. For typical state court reliance on Supreme Court jurisprudence in MPC 
states, see Saxton v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 293 (Ky. 2010), which explains the role of the 
Liparota holding on state drug laws, Saxton, 315 S.W.3d at 296, and Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 
582, 584 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996), which held that there is no culpability requirement for the age of 
minor victim in the sexual assault offense, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (West 1994). 
 145. Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability’s 
Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 111 (2012). 
 146. People v. Brooks, 648 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
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defendant’s knowledge of a particular victim’s infirmity before the 
criminal may suffer additional punishment because of that 
infirmity.”147 This view sharply conflicts with the Illinois code’s 
culpability presumptions, according to which “the prescribed mental 
state applies to each such element,” and “[i]f the statute does not 
prescribe a mental state applicable to an element,” recklessness “is 
applicable.”148 The Ohio Supreme Court made the same point: 
“[C]ommitting a theft offense is not innocent conduct. Consequently, 
it is reasonable that the General Assembly would impose strict 
liability on the additional circumstance of [possessing a 
weapon], . . . [an] activity that enhances the seriousness of the 
criminal activity”149 In Ward, an Ohio appellate court explained the 
strict-liability interpretation of the school-proximity drug offense by 
noting that it “does not criminalize otherwise innocent behavior.”150 
The Oregon Supreme Court invoked the same idea for the same 
holding, noting that drug offenders, near a school or not, are 
“engaging in their illegal activity.”151 
The principle, more fully described, seems to be this: criminal 
liability must always require proof of culpability regarding whatever 
core elements of an offense define its wrongful nature. For theft, one 
must culpably take property, recognizing that it is property of another. 
Similarly for drug offenses, one must culpably distribute, aware of a 
drug’s identity. Culpability thereby functions to ensure that actors 
know they are engaged in criminal rather than lawful conduct, or that 
they are reckless in that regard. 
The critical normative point is that this proof shifts an actor’s 
status from innocent to one justifiably eligible for punishment. 
Thereafter, strict liability is acceptable for further offense elements 
 
 147. Id. at 629 (explaining that mental-state requirements do not extend to “[e]nhancing 
provisions” because they only “concern consequences of the offense which make [the offense] 
more serious”). 
 148. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b) (West 2002) (emphasis added); see also id. § 5/4-9 
(explaining that strict liability is limited to “clearly indicated” exceptions). 
 149. State v. Lester, 916 N.E.2d 1038, 1042–43 (Ohio 2009); see also State v. Smith, 963 A.2d 
281, 289 (N.J. 2009) (providing similar reasoning for a strict-liability interpretation of the 
unlawful-firearm-possession offense, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-3 (West 2005)); State v. 
Maldonado, 645 A.2d 1165, 1176 (N.J. 1994) (conceding that “differential treatment based on 
result and regardless of state of mind” occurs under “any strict liability statute”). 
 150. State v. Ward, 637 N.E.2d 16, 18–19 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). 
 151. State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 365 (Or. 2007). 
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that define a more serious offense or that increase punishment.152 On 
this view, culpability plays no role in those grade and sentence 
distinctions. Courts commonly presume this view to be the 
legislature’s consistent principle that their interpretive choices should 
effectuate.153 
B. A Culpability-Based Rationale for Strict-Liability Elements 
Despite the widely invoked otherwise-innocent principle and its 
stated disregard for allowing culpability to play any role in 
distinguishing offense and punishment levels, the case law reveals 
implicit limits, which courts breach only occasionally, on the types of 
offense elements to which strict liability can attach. Those breaches, I 
will argue, indicate that a case is wrongly decided. Largely, the 
offense elements to which strict liability attaches are consequences 
and circumstances that can be said to be within the scope of the risk of 
the unlawful activity for which culpability is required.154 
 
 152. See Brooks, 648 N.E.2d at 629–30 (“Here the State was required to prove that 
defendant knew he was delivering cocaine. That conduct constituted a felony. The enhancing 
factor the State did not have to prove was that the defendant was aware of the proximity to 
public housing sites. That factor merely enhanced the offense to a more serious felony.”); State 
v. Harris, 623 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that the strict-liability 
element “merely enhances the sentence of the underlying drug trafficking offense” and that 
“[t]he mens rea requirement is met by the knowing sale or offer to sell a controlled substance,” 
which “assures that the ‘schoolyard’ provision does not ‘criminalize a broad range of apparently 
innocent conduct’”). 
  Punishment increases can be substantial. In Denby, the strict-liability school-zone 
element added a mandatory three consecutive years to a five-year sentence for the base drug 
offense. State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682, 685 (Conn. 1995); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.    
§ 21a-278a(b) (West 2006) (mandating that offenders “shall be imprisoned for a term of three 
years, which shall not be suspended and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of 
imprisonment imposed for violation of section 21a-277 [authorizing up to fifteen years in prison 
for distributing hallucinogens or narcotics and up to seven years for other controlled drugs] or 
21a-278 [setting a mandatory minimum sentence of five years—and a maximum of life in 
prison—for distributing more than half an ounce of cocaine and certain other drugs]”); id. § 21a-
278a(a) (mandating a minimum sentence of two consecutive years in prison for distribution of 
controlled substances to a person under the age of eighteen). 
 153. See, e.g., State v. Blanton, 588 P.2d 28, 29 (Or. 1978) (en banc) (noting that “[a] policy 
against criminal liability without fault need not go so far as to protect a culpable defendant from 
an unanticipated extent of liability” but then concluding that the legislature had rejected this 
policy and had chosen “to require a culpable mental state with respect to each element in the 
definition of an offense”). 
 154. For an excellent theoretical development of basically this idea, see Kenneth W. Simons, 
Is Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offences Consistent with Retributive Desert, 32 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 445, 446 (2012), which argues that strict liability can be justified with 
regard to culpability, inter alia, when the risk as to the strict-liability element is intrinsic to the 
lesser crime and minimally foreseeable. This is the critical distinction from Coke’s account that 
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If courts rarely describe the limits of their strict-liability 
inferences in these terms, that may be in part because the statutes, in 
an implicit sense, do so. Legislatures may leave unclear the extent of 
culpability requirements, but they do define the elements of offenses, 
and the result and circumstance elements to which strict liability 
attaches mostly have a plausible connection to the nature of the 
culpable conduct and the risks that such conduct might create. None 
of the judicial inferences of strict liability look quite as dramatically 
disproportionate as Coke’s approval of murder liability for one who 
intended only unlawful chicken killing.155 
Consider the kinds of elements to which courts attach strict 
liability. Elements regarding the age of participants in drug 
transactions or of victims in sex-related and other assault offenses 
commonly lack a mental-state requirement.156 But an actor can 
foresee that the other person might be under age eighteen (even if the 
actor in fact does not). And one is more likely to do so with activities 
that require interaction with the other person. Seeing another person 
provides at least a little information about age, and even though some 
teens appear a few years older than their age, the claim is not that 
only negligent actors make these mistakes. This is also true regarding 
a victim’s status as an “at risk” or mentally disabled person incapable 
of consenting to sex. Similarly, one who takes or damages property 
can be aware of the possibility that the property may be worth much 
more than one intends or foresees; the same is true for the weight or 
quantity of contraband one possesses. 
This account is related to the established rationale for strict 
liability in felony regulatory offenses, such as those governing 
 
murder liability can rest on an actor’s unlawful attempt to shoot fowl. See supra note 11. On the 
contemporary view, Coke’s shooter might be strictly liable for shooting a protected species, 
hunting out of season, or hunting without a license. But liability for an entirely different risk and 
harm—murder—would not rest on strict liability today, particularly not in circumstances in 
which no one in the position of Coke’s shooter would foresee injury to a person. 
 155. But for an argument that certain contemporary statutes in fact are grossly 
disproportionate, see HUSAK, supra note 6, at 45–54, 74–75, which criticizes a New Jersey drug 
offense, see supra note 137, for imposing strict homicide liability.  
 156. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:24-4(6), 2C:35-6 (West 2005) (mandating strict liability 
as to the minor’s age for the offense of endangering the welfare of children by engaging in 
sexual acts and for the offense of involving minors in drug activities); People v. Brooks, 648 
N.E.2d 626, 630 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (“A number of decisions of State courts, consistent with our 
decision here, uphold statutory provisions enhancing penalties for illegal drug activities which 
take place within a prescribed distance of schools even though the perpetrators are unaware of 
the existence of the schools.”); Carpenter, supra note 23, at 385–91 (surveying and classifying 
statutory rape statutes). 
BROWN IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL REVISED (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2012  10:02 AM 
2012] PERSISTENCE OF STRICT LIABILITY 329 
firearms. Under that doctrine, knowledge that one is engaged in 
highly regulated conduct, such as possession of certain weapons, but 
not ordinary rifles,157 displaces a need for culpability as to elements 
that make the conduct criminal, such as the weapon’s unregistered 
status or absence of serial numbers.158 In both settings, actors might be 
reasonable in not recognizing that the strict-liability element exists. 
Yet the element (nonregistration) bears a plausible relation to the 
knowing conduct (possession); it is within the scope of risks one can 
foresee from that conduct. 
This description suggests an intelligible, if ultimately 
unpersuasive, normative justification for many strict-liability 
decisions.159 Strict-liability elements are facts as to which actors, 
engaged in culpable conduct, oftentimes are negligent, and in some 
cases reckless. Although this is not true in every case—one who is 
engaged in sexual activity, for example, may have good reasons to 
think a particular partner is over a specified age—the generalization 
about negligence is plausible for most scenarios implicated by these 
sorts of strict-liability elements. If that is so, then strict-liability 
elements have more connection to culpability than they initially seem 
to. On this generalization, strict liability does not reject culpability’s 
relevance but merely serves it imperfectly; strict liability is a clear rule 
with the inevitable weaknesses of clear rules—it is overinclusive for 
some cases and thus generates some “false positives.”160 The critical 
supposition here is that, in many offenses, proof of offense elements, 
even without proof of culpability for the strict-liability element, 
nonetheless frequently allows an inference of minimal culpability—
 
 157. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994). 
 158. Id. at 619; People v. Stanley, 921 N.E.2d 445, 452–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); State v. 
Jordan, 733 N.E.2d 601, 606–07 (Ohio 2000). 
 159. For a more extensive and subtle development of a closely related argument, see 
Simons, supra note 154. 
 160. Professor Frederick Schauer wrote the definitive work on the nature, and virtue, of 
rules in this respect, developing the insight that rules that are clear and easy to administer but 
generate an imperfect record of outcomes across cases can be preferable to more costly, 
discretionary, individualized decision making. See generally FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, PLAYING 
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN 
LAW AND IN LIFE (1993); Frederick F. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (“At the 
heart of the word ‘formalism,’ in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking 
according to rule. Formalism is the way in which rules achieve their ‘ruleness’: precisely by 
doing what is supposed to be the failing of formalism: screening off from a decisionmaker 
factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into account.”). 
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recklessness, or perhaps only negligence161—for the strict-liability 
element. When that is true given the nature of a particular crime, the 
normative rationale for strict liability improves. Strict liability, in the 
context of such offenses, does not signal a rejection of culpability’s 
justifying role; instead it represents a trade-off of the costs for proof 
of culpability that is inferable in most such cases even without that 
proof requirement. 
IV.  WHY COURTS CIRCUMVENT CULPABILITY PRESUMPTIONS 
A. Culpability’s Limited Significance 
The account just presented provides much of the most plausible 
explanation for why state courts in the last three to four decades have 
so frequently circumvented rather than given effect to the culpability 
presumptions that their legislatures adopted in the era of MPC-
inspired criminal-law reform. Key reasons are explicit in the recurrent 
themes of judicial reasoning on mens rea questions. Courts simply are 
not persuaded by the normative premise that the MPC offered to 
state reformers and that the strongest codifications of its model would 
seem to instantiate: liability should generally and presumptively 
accord with individual culpability, and distinctions in offense gravity 
and punishment severity should rest on proof of an actor’s fault as 
well as proof of facts. Instead, courts widely endorse a more limited 
conception of culpability’s function, the otherwise-innocent principle 
or a principle of threshold culpability.162 Under that principle, 
culpability’s only task is to separate innocent from guilty actors. Once 
an actor has placed himself in the latter group, liability and 
punishment can be adjusted without regard to fault. Courts are 
explicit on that much. Implicitly and with little direct 
acknowledgement, the body of strict-liability decisions suggests an 
additional rationale: strict-liability elements that adjust sanctions for 
those who cross the threshold of basic culpability are often of a nature 
that suggests an actor’s culpability even as to those elements. 
It bears emphasis that the scope-of-the-risk rationale is at best 
implicit, because courts’ failure to engage that rationale as a limit on 
strict liability probably accounts for the rationale’s failure to guide 
courts in all strict-liability decisions. Courts’ explicit reasons for strict 
 
 161. I hold aside here the debate of whether negligence is minimally sufficient for criminal 
liability. 
 162. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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liability, by contrast, are predominantly instrumental. In the vast 
majority of decisions discussed in this Article, courts justify strict-
liability punishments—beyond the threshold-culpability rationale—by 
reference to the deterrence and harm-prevention functions of the 
offense. After proof shifts an actor’s status from innocent to criminal, 
judicial attention shifts to victim and public interests in safety, with no 
recognition of any defendant or public interest in punishment graded 
by culpability. If a statute’s purpose is to protect minors, any further 
culpability requirement is counterproductive to a policy of achieving 
additional protection by additional punishment. Proof requirements 
(of any sort) always make the state’s case harder to win and thus 
punishment harder to impose.163 An Illinois court offered a typical 
observation on this point: “Requiring proof of defendant’s knowledge 
of the victim’s age would nullify much of the protection the 
legislature intended because a person’s age may not be readily 
ascertainable.”164 In the offense of endangering a child’s welfare, a 
New Jersey court refused “to require proof that a defendant knew his 
conduct would impair or debauch the child’s morals, as such a 
construction would weaken the very protection of children that the 
Legislature has for decades striven to achieve.”165 Similarly for drug 
offenses near a school: “[T]he legislature intended to protect children 
from drug use . . . . [R]equiring a knowing mental state with regard to 
the distance element would work against the obvious legislative 
purpose . . . .”166 The category of reasons for justifying liability and 
punishment simply shifts to entirely different grounds. For actors at 
fault of a basic offense, culpability no longer enters the discussion for 
why a mens rea requirement might be required. Judicial focus 
becomes overwhelmingly utilitarian. 
B. Judicial Roles and Political Consensus 
Taking the search for explanations one step further, consider 
why courts so consistently limit themselves to instrumentalist 
 
 163. Cf., e.g., Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 668 (Colo. 2000) (explaining that the 
prosecution bears the burden of proving “all elements of the offense,” which in that case meant 
that the state must prove that “the person whom the defendant knowingly induced . . . to violate 
a law . . . was a minor at the time of the offense,” but not “that the defendant knew the person 
was a minor”). 
 164. People v. Gramo, 623 N.E.2d 926, 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
 165. State v. Bryant, 15 A.3d 865, 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (discussing an 
eighteen-year-old convicted of having sex with a fourteen-year-old). 
 166. State v. Rutley, 171 P.3d 361, 365 (Or. 2007).  
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rationales as tools for interpreting mens rea requirements. Why 
doesn’t culpability’s role in apportioning punishment—inherent in the 
presumptions by which these courts are bound—resonate more often 
as a counterweight argument, even if not the predominate one? A 
likely reason is the one sketched in the Introduction: at the same time 
that the MPC was prompting legislatures to reform their criminal 
codes and adopt (in many cases) strong presumptions for mens rea 
requirements, legislatures were also reforming criminal law in an 
entirely different direction. Beginning roughly in the early 1970s, 
federal and state governments expanded their catalogues of criminal 
offenses, sharply increased sentences, reduced parole possibilities and 
judicial discretion in sentencing, and generally expanded the capacity 
of criminal-justice system, especially the prison system.167 American 
incarceration rates for the several decades through the 1960s roughly 
tracked European rates, imprisoning about one hundred to 150 
residents per 100,000.168 Between the 1970s and the 2000s, those rates 
have approximately quintupled to more than 600 per 100,000—rates 
unprecedented in American history and in other advanced nations, 
and in virtually all nations of any developmental or political status.169 
This put state courts—at least courts in states that adopted 
strong MPC culpability rules—in a bind. Those new code provisions 
called for a substantial change in courts’ analytical methods and tools 
for interpreting criminal statutes, and they also suggested a 
substantive shift away from common-law traditions of inferring strict-
liability elements in many offense elements. That revision is hard 
enough to implement. But at the same time, everything else in 
legislative decision making about criminal law seemed to point in the 
other direction, the direction of increasing punishment and efficiently 
 
 167. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 168. See, e.g., JUSTICE POL’Y INST., THE PUNISHING DECADE: PRISON AND JAIL 
ESTIMATES AT THE MILLENNIUM 1 (2000) (charting the rapid rise in U.S. incarceration rates 
beginning in the 1970S); see also infra note 169. 
 169. See, e.g., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 6, at 1 (“[A] stunning 1 in every 31 
adults [in the United States], or 3.2 percent, is under some form of correctional control.”); PEW 
CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/Prison_Count_2010.pdf 
(noting that U.S. prison populations grew 705 percent from 1970 to 2010); ROY WALMSLEY, 
WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (11th ed. 2011), available at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-22.pdf (comparing incarceration rates for 218 countries and 
noting that “[t]he United States has the highest prison population rate in the world, 743 per 
100,000,” while “more than half the countries and territories (54%) have rates below 150 per 
100,000”). 
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facilitating convictions. The last four decades have been an unlikely 
period during which to expect courts to increase mens rea 
requirements over their pre-MPC traditions, or to hold legislatures to 
their own, codified commitments to expanded culpability 
requirements. 
Strict and dedicated adherence to MPC-based culpability 
presumptions, in short, called on courts to take a counter-political 
role. To infer mens rea requirements is to make crimes harder to 
prove. At the appellate decision-making level, it means reversing 
convictions. As a feature of separation of powers, it means requiring 
legislatures to be very clear in creating exceptions to their own rule 
that culpability is presumed for every offense element, which means 
offenses remain harder for prosecutors to prove—after courts read 
them to contain mens rea requirements—at least until legislatures get 
around to amending the statute. Most state court judges hold office 
by virtue of some sort of electoral process; others do so by political 
appointment, but apparently none, save in Rhode Island, hold life 
tenure like federal judges.170 Taking up the task of enforcing mens rea 
presumptions that seem to counter every other executive- and 
legislative-branch signal about the criminal law policy preferences 
was a lot—it turns out, too much—to ask. 
V.  THE COSTS OF INSTRUMENTAL REASONING AND 
UNACKNOWLEDGED RATIONALES 
If there was ever a struggle between the MPC’s principle of 
proportionate liability and the older, more limited understanding of 
the “guilty mind” that must accompany a wrongful act, the 
proportionality idea lost. Overwhelmingly, the express rationales that 
govern mens rea interpretation even in MPC states are the ideas of 
threshold culpability and instrumental harm prevention—companion 
ideas that a guilty individual is eligible for any degree of punishment 
necessary to achieve the ends of public safety, without regard to his 
culpability for the offense elements that guide upward, instrumental 
adjustments in sanctions. 
 
 170. Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on 
Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107, 110 (2007) (stating that judges in thirty-nine states 
face periodic election); Linda Greenhouse, New Focus on the Effects of Life Tenure, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, at A20 (“Most countries place term or age limits on their high-court 
judges, as do 49 states (all but Rhode Island).”). 
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In the main, I have suggested, the pattern of strict-liability 
decisions fits a rationale that courts do not acknowledge: strict-
liability elements tend to be those within the scope of the risks of the 
culpable conduct, which commonly raises an inference of culpability 
even as to those elements for which proof of mens rea is not required. 
But there is a cost to an implicit premise that courts rarely 
acknowledge. The cost in this setting is that courts are less likely to 
apply an unarticulated limit on strict liability consistently, and they 
are more likely to focus on instrumental functions of punishment and 
to reach decisions that breach the implicit scope-of-risk premise. 
Several examples of strict-liability decisions can be understood to 
violate this parameter. Three examples make the point. 
Offenses that punish assault or homicide more severely when the 
victim was a law enforcement official provide an example. In many 
such cases, the officer-victim was working undercover, posing as a 
fellow criminal; the strategy is to prevent the offender from having 
any suspicion of the officer’s true status.171 It is easy to understand the 
view that knowingly assaulting an officer is a more culpable crime 
than assaulting a civilian, but it is harder to see how assaulting a 
fellow criminal is less culpable than assaulting one whom an actor 
reasonably believed to be a fellow criminal but who turned out to be 
an undercover officer. Yet some state courts (including MPC states) 
impose strict liability as to a victim’s official identity, even when that 
fact elevates noncapital murder to capital murder.172 
 
 171. See, e.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 674 (1975) (“[T]he evidence shows that 
[Defendant] and his confederates arranged for a sale of heroin to buyers who turned out to be 
undercover agents for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.”).  
 172. Compare Ex parte Murry, 455 So. 2d 72, 76 (Ala. 1984), (holding that knowledge of an 
officer’s identity is required in capital murder), superseded by Undercover Officers Protection 
Act of 1987, No. 87-709, 1987 Ala. Laws 1252 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40 
(LexisNexis 2005)), with State v. Brown, 998 P.2d 321, 327 (Wash. 2000) (“[T]he State is not 
required to charge and prove that a defendant at the time of the assault knew the victim was a 
law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of official duties.”). The difference is 
apparent in statutes as well; some contain explicit knowledge or negligence requirements. 
Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201 (5)(c)(I) (2012) (requiring that the “defendant knew 
or should have known” that the victim was an officer); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A)(6) 
(West 2006) (same); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(1) (West 2011) (same); and UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(m) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (same), with MO. ANN. STAT. § 
565.032(2)(8) (West 2012) (including no knowledge requirement), and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9711(d)(1) (West 2007) (same). State courts often cite the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion 
for the same federal offense that the purpose of police-protection statutes “could well be 
frustrated by the imposition of a strict scienter requirement.” Feola, 420 U.S. at 678. 
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Another example is homicide liability for drug sellers when a 
buyer subsequently dies from voluntarily ingesting the drugs.173 One 
criticism stresses the attenuated causation in such cases: the drug 
buyer’s voluntary choice to ingest drugs would normally be 
characterized as the primary and proximate cause of death, and 
thereby also as an intervening cause that bars the seller’s liability for 
the death.174 A second criticism assesses the drug seller’s negligence or 
lack thereof. One view could be that every reasonable person knows 
that providing illicit drugs to another creates an undue risk of the 
buyer’s death. It is more plausible to conclude that sellers know from 
experience that most drug users consume drugs without immediate 
fatal consequences (otherwise the customer base quickly vanishes); 
sellers therefore reasonably assess any buyer’s risk of death from a 
single drug sale as minimal. On that view, the death is outside the 
scope of the risk that made the seller’s drug-distribution conduct 
dangerous, and no inference of even a negligent mental state is 
justified. 
Finally, consider the school-zone drug offenses. It is debatable 
whether negligence (hold aside recklessness) as to school proximity 
can be reliably assumed in enough cases to justify strict liability. On 
the one hand, one might assume that all urban residents know that it 
is always possible a school can be nearby even when not in view. On 
the other hand, city schools often are not only several streets away 
but are also separated by visual and pedestrian barriers like train 
tracks or interstate highways; even reasonable people, familiar with 
neighborhoods, may not foresee that a school property comes within 
one thousand feet. Courts occasionally concede this.175 On this latter 
 
 173. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.317a (2004) (imposing homicide liability for drug sellers 
whose buyers die from ingesting drugs); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2005) (same). 
Notably, these strict-liability offenses are explicitly imposed by legislatures rather than inferred 
by courts. 
 174. For a much more extensive criticism of this offense as “an example of 
overcriminalization,” see HUSAK, supra note 6, at 45–54. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Falu, 776 F.2d 46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 1985) (conceding that one 
might reasonably not know one’s distance from a school in “urban areas where schools are not 
clearly visible from points within the 1,000-foot zone or are not readily identifiable”). A survey 
of large-city school locations on Google Maps suggests that one can be less than one thousand 
feet from a school and yet separated by interstate highways, railway lines, rivers, or other 
pedestrian and sight barriers. A random example from Google Maps is the Philadelphia School 
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 2501 Lombard Street, Philadelphia, PA 19146, GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com (search “2501 Lombard Street, Philadelphia, PA 19146”). 
  Skepticism about the normative legitimacy of aggravating punishment upon this fact 
alone increases if one views the school-distance element as an excessive prophylactic against the 
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view, at least, inferring an offender’s negligence as to school 
proximity is not justified. If recklessness is the minimal culpable 
mental state (as most state interpretive presumptions dictate),176 an 
inference of culpability is even weaker. 
Many examples of courts’ strict-liability interpretations, I have 
argued, rest on the premise that culpability can be assumed for 
certain classes of offenses in which the offender is usually negligent or 
reckless as to the strict-liability element, and therefore absence of a 
proof requirement is not as grave a breach of the correspondence 
principle as it seems. But for offenses such as these three examples, 
that assumption is less plausible. A finding of negligence and 
recklessness requires not merely factual determinations (for example, 
do reasonable people foresee this risk) but evaluative ones (for 
example, is the risk substantial and disregard of it unjustifiable). 
Reaching the evaluative conclusion about a category of offenders 
seems more justified for some offenses, such as those defined by the 
age of minors with whom an offender closely interacted, than in 
others, such as these three examples (undercover agents, drug deaths, 
and perhaps school zones). In the sorts of cases that these latter 
examples represent, strict liability cannot easily (or at all) be justified 
by the implicit scope-of-the-risk rationale. Most courts seem to 
recognize this, judging by how widely they rely on instrumental 
explanations unrelated to culpability in many decisions.177 But they 
 
underlying interest it serves, in keeping school children from exposure to drug dealers and 
transactions. (Typically, it does not matter whether school is in session or whether children are 
in sight of the offense.) For a typical legislative statement of this purpose, see TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 39-17-432(a) (2010). 
 176. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 251(b) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-204 
(LexisNexis 2007); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-3(b) (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
5202(e) (Supp. 2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301(c) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
6.02(c) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-102 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 177. Perhaps what makes so many amenable to strict liability in this offense is not simply the 
assumptions about the probability of the circumstance (school proximity) but also the gravity of 
that circumstance and the amount of liability and punishment dependent upon it. Even if the 
odds of having a nearby school are long in some settings such that overlooking it is reasonable, 
close proximity to a school is in some sense within the nature of an urban drug sale. Put 
differently, the punishment triggered by its occurrence is not grossly out of proportion to what 
offenders might expect for the basic offense. In comparison, a homicide triggering murder 
liability from culpably shooting at fowl is much more distinct from the nature of the culpable 
act, and the sanction is much greater, even if in some scenarios the odds of human injury are not 
wildly long. Vice President Dick Cheney learned something about those odds. See Anne E. 
Kornblut, Cheney Shoots Fellow Hunter in Mishap on a Texas Ranch, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2006, 
at A1 (“Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally shot and wounded a prominent Austin, Tex., 
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also are not to be bothered by it, which may represent either the 
triumph of the threshold culpability principle over the proportionate 
liability principle or a failure by courts to recognize the limits of the 
scope-of-the-risk rationale, because it is only an implicit commitment 
which courts can easily overlook. 
CONCLUSION 
From this survey of case law and statutes in MPC states, it is hard 
to doubt the failure of the MPC’s culpability principle under which 
subjective fault is essential to the proportionate assignment of liability 
and punishment.  With some encouragement from legislatures that 
departed from the MPC in significant respects, courts in MPC states 
have widely interpreted their criminal statutes in accord with a more 
limited culpability principle, one which embraces strict-liability 
elements and rejects the MPC’s strong commitment to proportionate 
punishment for actors found to be blameworthy for some aspect of an 
offense. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that this view long 
characterized pre-MPC criminal law.178 Strict liability remains deeply 
engrained and accepted in American criminal law,179 and probably in 
public opinion.180 It shares something in common with the larger and 
 
lawyer on Saturday while the two men were quail hunting in South Texas, firing a shotgun at the 
man while trying to aim for a bird . . . .”). 
 178. See generally, e.g., Jeremy Horder, Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens 
Rea, 113 L.Q. REV. 95 (1997) (describing the history of mens rea doctrine as inconsistent with 
and more complicated than the correspondence principle that scholars widely endorsed in the 
mid-twentieth century). 
 179. Scholars have likewise noted that for English criminal law, the correspondence 
principle is an aspirational rather than descriptive claim. See NICOLA LACEY, CELIA WELL & 
OLIVER QUICK, RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINAL LAW 60–61 (3d ed. 2003) (noting prominent 
statutory exceptions to the correspondence principle); Jeremy Horder, A Critique of the 
Correspondence Principle of Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 759, 759 (explaining that the 
correspondence principle “remains very much an ideal, if anything, rather than an accurate 
descriptive generalisation”). See generally Horder, supra note 178 (offering a historical account 
of English criminal law and finding no tradition of the correspondence principle). 
 180. Professor Paul Robinson, the leading American scholar of criminal codes, has tested 
public lay views on comparisons among the grading levels of various offenses, many of which 
were defined by consequences (for example, the value of property taken in theft or injury 
resulting from assault). The data suggest that lay judgments about comparative offense severity 
often differ from those codified in criminal statutes, although grading views turned on results 
and circumstances as well as state of mind, not always with the former limited by the latter. 
Robinson et al., supra note 112, at 714–15. Robinson and his coauthors argue that 
correspondence between majoritarian judgments and criminal law values is important to law’s 
legitimacy and efficacy. See id. at 715 (“Assessments of proper offense grade are classic 
expressions of societal values, which are properly set by the most democratic branch of 
government and the one charged with collectively making such value judgments—the 
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longstanding problem of “moral luck” that characterizes even core 
criminal offenses, some of which hold an actor responsible for events 
beyond his control.181 Evidence for this view lies not only in mens rea 
requirements but in sentencing statutes and guidelines as well, which 
adjust sentences based on results and circumstances without regard to 
a defendant’s intent or awareness.182 If broader sentiment and 
legislative policy do not suggest a consistent endorsement of a strong 
role for culpability in punishment allocation, it is easier to understand 
why courts have not moved to strengthen culpability requirements 
despite the seeming commands of presumptions in many state codes. 
 
 
legislature.”); id. at 717 n.3 (“[N]on-uniformity of sentences [due to reliance on judicial 
discretion instead of legislative command] may . . . negatively affect compliance with the law by 
reducing the public perception of the legal system as legitimate . . . .”); id. at 717 (“[I]mproper 
grading of offenses can lead to inefficient spending.”). 
 181. See Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, STANFORD ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY (June 3, 2008), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/moral-luck (“Moral luck occurs when an agent 
can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment despite the fact that a significant aspect 
of what she is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control . . . . The problem of moral 
luck arises because we seem to be committed to the general principle that we are morally 
assessable only to the extent that what we are assessed for depends on factors under our 
control. . . . At the same time, when it comes to countless particular cases, we morally assess 
agents for things that depend on factors that are not in their control. . . . [I]f we accept the 
Control Principle in unqualified form, and deny the existence of moral circumstantial, character, 
and causal luck, then it seems that no actual punishment could be justified on the basis of moral 
desert.); see also GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 473–74 (1978) (calling the 
role that results should play in offense definitions a “deep, unresolved issue in criminal 
liability”). For a comprehensive discussion of moral luck theory, see generally BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK (1981). 
 182. See, e.g., MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § 2.B.503 (2012) (noting 
offense severity distinctions based on drug weight); id. § 2.G (incorporating offense severity 
distinctions based on consequences in an Offense Severity Reference Table, id. § 5.A); OR. 
ADMIN. R. 213-019-0008 (2004) (outlining drug offense aggravators); 204 PA. CODE §§ 303.9, 
303.10 (2012) (including offense results and circumstances as sentence-enhancement criteria). 
